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Starting in the 1990s, Federal policy has moved in the direction of a market-
oriented approach towards sound recording rights, beginning with Congress’ de-
cision to create a sound recording performance copyright in 1995. In 1998, Con-
gress provided that most statutory royalty rates, including the rates paid by 
webcasters like Pandora Radio, would be set using a market-based “willing buyer, 
willing seller” (“WBWS”) standard. Since then, the WBWS standard has been 
applied in several rate setting proceedings, but complaints from webcasters that 
the rates were “too high” have led to Congressional intervention and, ultimately, 
to adoption of rates below market levels. Now, as a new rate setting cycle is about 
to get underway, webcasters have begun lobbying Congress to replace the WBWS 
standard with a new version of the so-called 801(b) standard, which promises cop-
yright users a right of “non-disruption.” Adoption of the 801(b) standard – and the 
other changes favored by the webcasters – would result in rates below economical-
ly efficient levels, thereby distorting markets, slowing innovation and harming con-
sumers. This paper examines the market for sound recording performance rights, 
concluding that Congress should resist webcasters’ pleas for regulatory favoritism 
and instead continue moving towards a market-oriented approach, starting with 
extending the sound performance right to terrestrial radio. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Until 1995, the principal protections afforded to holders of sound recording 
copyrights were rights of reproduction and distribution.1 Thus, copyright hold-
ers of sound recordings, such as record companies, could monetize the copying 
and distribution of their recordings, but could not charge for “performances,” 
such as when radio stations played copyrighted music.2 In the absence of such 
a property right, naturally, the sound recording owner’s income was limited to 
sales revenue of CDs and other such phonorecords.3 
Beginning with passage of the Digital Performance Right in Sound Record-
ings Act (“DPRA”) in 1995,4 Congress has moved gradually in the direction of 
creating performance rights and putting in place the conditions to allow such 
rights to be traded at market (that is, economically efficient) rates.5 The first 
sound recording performance right, for certain digital performances, was creat-
ed by DPRA, which also created a compulsory license for nonexempt, non-
interactive, digital subscription transmissions.6 In 1998, Congress expanded the 
compulsory license to additional digital performances in the Digital Millenni-
um Copyright Act (“DMCA”).7 As a result, for some rights, particularly “inter-
active” services, buyers and sellers bargain freely over rates and conditions.8 
                                                     
 1 Brian R. Day, Collective Management of Music Copyright in the Digital Age: The 
Online Clearinghouse, 18 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 195, 204 (2010); see also Joshua P. Bind-
er, Current Developments of Public Performance Rights for Sound Recordings Transmitted 
Online: You Push Play, but Who Gets Paid?, 22 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1, 11 (2001). 
 2 Binder, supra note 1, at 11. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 
109 Stat. 336 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2012)). 
 5 See Performance Rights Act of 2009, H.R. 848, S. 379, 111th Cong. (2009) (propos-
ing to grant sound-recording-performance rights to terrestrial broadcasters); Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (Oct. 28, 1998) [hereinafter 
DMCA] (adding, among other things, the “willing buyer, willing seller” standard, and ex-
panding § 114 to cover eligible nonsubscription services). 
 6 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2012) (giving copyright owners of sound recordings the exclu-
sive right to “perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmis-
sion”); see 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2)–(3), (f) (2012) (imposing the nonexempt, noninteractive, 
digital subscription transmission licensing requirements); see also Public Performance of 
Sound Recordings: Definition of Service, 65 Fed. Reg. 33,266, 33,266 (May 23, 2000) 
(“Among the limitations on the performance was the creation of a licensing scheme for in-
teractive digital audio services and a compulsory license for nonexempt, noninteractive, 
digital subscription transmissions.”). 
 7 DMCA § 405(a)(1)(B), 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2); see also Mary Ann Lane, “Interactive 
Services” and the Future of Internet Radio Broadcasts, 62 ALA. L. REV. 464 (2011). 
 8 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1), (d)(2)(A)(i); In re Rate Setting for Digital Performance Right 
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However, “non-interactive” services (i.e., radio-like “streaming” services), 
may take advantage of a compulsory license: Buyers and sellers have the op-
tion of negotiating voluntary agreements (which is generally done on an indus-
try-wide basis), but if they fail to do so, sellers are required to license rights at 
government-determined “statutory” rates.9 
In this context, the criteria for setting statutory rates are obviously im-
portant. For most non-interactive services, the DMCA established a “willing 
buyer/willing seller” (“WBWS”) standard, which is intended to set rates at 
“strictly fair market value.”10 In practice, as implemented by Copyright Arbi-
tration Royalty Panels (“CARP”)11 and later by the Copyright Royalty Board 
(“CRB”),12 the WBWS standard has resulted in a market-oriented approach to 
setting rates. 
In adopting the WBWS standard, Congress chose to reject the previous, less 
market-oriented standard used in the DPRA—a standard that utilized the four-
part test under § 801(b) of the 1976 Copyright Act.13 Unlike the WBWS stand-
ard, the 801(b) standard requires regulators to take into account non-market 
based criteria in setting royalties for statutory licenses, including specifically to 
set rates so as to protect licensees against any “disruptive” effects that might be 
caused by paying royalties—no matter how market-oriented they may be.14 
                                                                                                                          
in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No. 2000-9 DTRA 1 & 2, at 8 
(Copyright Arb. Royalty Panel Feb. 20, 2002) [hereinafter CARP Report] (discussing the 
negotiations required in order to transmit sound recordings on an interactive basis); see 
Lane, supra note 7, at 467; see also Arista Records v. Launch Media, 578 F.3d 148, 154 (2d 
Cir. 2009) (discussing the fact that the interactive services are likely to have a significant 
impact on traditional records sales, because of the increased options that the services give to 
consumers). 
 9 Lane, supra note 7, at 465. 
 10 Determination of Reasonable Rates and Terms for the Digital Performance of Sound 
Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,240, 45,244 (July 8, 2002) (codi-
fied at 37 C.F.R. pt. 261) [hereinafter Webcaster I] (asserting that the “standard for setting 
rates for nonsubscription services . . . is strictly fair market value—willing buyer/willing 
seller”), aff’d, Beethoven.com v. Librarian of Congress, 394 F.3d 939 (D.C. Cir. 2005); 
Brian Flavin, A Digital Cry for Help: Internet Radio’s Struggle to Survive a Second Royalty 
Rate Determination under the Willing Buyer/Willing Seller Standard, 27 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. 
L. REV. 427, 438 (2008). 
 11 Flavin, supra note 10, at 435. 
 12 Id. at 438. 
 13 DMCA § 405 (“[I]n addition to the objectives set forth in section 801(b)(1), the 
[CARP] may consider the rates and terms for comparable types of subscription digital audio 
transmission services and comparable circumstances under voluntary [negotiated] license 
agreements.”); see also 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1)(A)–(D) (2012). 
 14 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1)(D) (requiring, inter alia, that rates be calculated to “minimize 
any disruptive impact on the structure of the industries involved and on generally prevailing 
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Thus, the 801(b) standard arguably grants licensees a de facto right to perpetu-
al profitability, allowing licensees to argue that they and their business models 
have a right to be protected from “disruption.”15 In the dynamic world of online 
content delivery—in which new and improved business models are constantly 
replacing old, obsolete ones—the creation of such a right has obvious negative 
consequences for innovation. 
Fortunately, the 801(b) standard currently applies to only a handful of com-
panies, which were “grandfathered” when the DMCA was adopted.16 Thus, 
royalties for all other sound recording performance rights are established either 
through direct market negotiations among the parties or, for compulsory li-
censes, under the market-oriented WBWS standard.17 Moreover, in recent 
years, Congress has shown substantial interest in bringing the one significant 
remaining area in which property rights are lacking—over-the-air performanc-
es by terrestrial broadcasters—under a market-oriented framework, by extend-
ing the sound recording performance right to such performances.18 In short, the 
recent history of the sound recording performance right has been clearly in the 
direction of a more market-oriented approach. 
In mid-2012, however, legislation was introduced in both the House and 
Senate that would reverse the pro-market trend by replacing the WBWS stand-
ard with the less-market-oriented 801(b) standard for the compulsory licenses 
for sound recording performances. The Internet Radio Fairness Act (“IRFA”) 
(H.R. 6480 in the House; S. 3609 in the Senate)19—which was supported by 
some webcasters, like Pandora20—would have required copyright judges to 
                                                                                                                          
industry practices”); see also Lauren E. Kilgore, Guerilla Radio: Has the Time Come for a 
Full Performance Right in Sound Recordings?, 12 VAND. J. ENT. L. 549, 565 (2010) 
 15 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1)(D); see also Determination of Rates and Terms for Preexisting 
Subscription Services and Satellite Digital Audio Radio Services, 73 Fed. Reg. 4080, 4083 
(Copyright Royalty Bd. Jan. 24, 2008) [hereinafter SDARS I] (believing that “postponing 
investment in new satellite technology” would have a “potential disruptive effect”). 
 16 Designation As a Preexisting Subscription Service, 71 Fed. Reg. 64,639, 64,641 
(Nov. 3, 2006). 
 17 Under § 114(f)(1)(B), the § 801(b)(1) standards apply to Pre-Existing Subscription 
Services (“PSS”) and satellite digital audio services (“SDARS”). See 17 U.S.C. § 
114(f)(1)(B). Section 114(f)(2)(B) establishes the WBWS standard for eligible non-
subscription services and subscription services. Id. § 114(f)(2)(B). Section 114(d) exempts 
interactive services from the statutory licensing regime. Id. § 114(d)(1), (d)(2)(A)(i). 
 18 Performance Rights Act of 2009, H.R. 848, S. 379, 111th Cong. 
 19 See generally Internet Radio Fairness Act of 2012, H.R. 6480, S. 3609, 112th Cong. 
(2012). 
 20 Steve Knopper, Pandora Clashes with Musicians over Song Payments: Singers Per-
form on Capitol Hill Before Hearing on Internet Radio Fairness Act, ROLLING STONE (Dec. 
3, 2012), http://commcns.org/NOqr9R. 
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take into account whether market-based royalty rates might “disrupt” the busi-
ness models of licensees.21 It goes without saying that the webcasters who sup-
ported the bill had expected the 801(b) approach to result in lower royalties 
than under the current market-based standard. 
The IRFA did not stop, however, at imposing the anti-disruption standard on 
future royalty proceedings. It contained a series of additional measures, all de-
signed to tilt the institutional playing field to the advantage of webcasters, in-
cluding prohibiting the CRB from considering certain types of evidence and 
forcing it to ignore relevant precedents.22 As if to ensure that economics will 
play as small a role as possible in future CRB deliberations, the Act even re-
moved the requirement that at least one of the three CRB judges have expertise 
in economics.23 
As this article will explain below, the arguments offered in support of the 
IRFA—that it was necessary to ensure a vibrant market for digital music, or 
that it would “level the playing field” by subjecting all digital music distribu-
tors to the same copyright regime—are unfounded. The market for digital mu-
sic is growing by leaps and bounds and the rapid growth of online advertising 
and wireless broadband ensure that it will continue to do so.24 Webcasters are 
not paying “unreasonable” rates and are fully capable of paying market rates in 
the future. Moreover, imposing the 801(b) standard on webcaster royalty pro-
ceedings would not address the most serious imbalances in the current royalty 
regime, including the fact that over-the-air broadcasts by terrestrial broadcast-
ers continue to be exempt altogether from the sound recording performance 
right.25 
Part II of this article presents a brief history of the sound recording perfor-
mance right. Part III reviews the implementation of the WBWS and 801(b) 
standards by the CARP and the CRB, and explains why, in practice, the 801(b) 
standard is likely to result in below-market rates. Part IV explains why the 
rates established for non-interactive online music services under the WBWS 
standard are both efficient and “reasonable,” and details the harm to innova-
tion, competition and consumers that would result from adoption of the 801(b) 
standard for all statutory royalty proceedings. Part V presents a brief summary 
                                                     
 21 Internet Radio Fairness Act of 2012 § 3 (replacing the “willing buyer, willing stand-
ard” with § 801(b)(1)); see also 158 Cong. Rec. S6628, S6628 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 2012) 
(statement of Sen. Wyden) (introducing the Internet Radio Fairness Act of 2012, S. 3609). 
 22 See Internet Radio Fairness Act of 2012 § 3; see also 158 Cong. Rec. at S6628. 
 23 Internet Radio Fairness Act of 2012 § 2. 
 24 See infra Part IV. 
 25 17 U.S.C. § 114(D)(1)(A). 
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and offers a few concluding thoughts. Specifically, it recommends that Con-
gress return to the market-oriented path it started down in the 1990s, beginning 
with extending the sound performance right to terrestrial radio. 
 
II.          THE SOUND RECORDING PERFORMANCE RIGHTS: A 
BRIEF HISTORY 
 
Under § 102 of the Copyright Act of 1976, there are two types of copyrights 
associated with recorded music.26 The first copyright protects the “musical 
work,” which consists of notes and lyrics written by the composer.27 This “mu-
sical work” copyright is typically held by a music publisher.28 The second type 
of copyright, “sound recording,” protects subsequent recordings of a given 
song by a particular artist.29 This “sound recording” copyright is typically held 
by the producer of the sound recording, most often a record label.30 
Prior to 1995, there was an important distinction between the rights in a mu-
sical work copyright and a sound recording copyright. The owner of a musical 
work copyright was granted a “performance right,” which entitled her to com-
pensation whenever her copyrighted work was performed or broadcast public-
ly.31 The owner of a sound recording copyright, however, was not granted a 
                                                     
 26 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 72 Fed. 
Reg. 24,084, 24,086 (May 1, 2007) (codified at 37 C.R.F. pt. 380) [hereinafter Webcaster II] 
(noting that § 102 of the Copyright Act “identifies various categories of works that are eli-
gible for copyright protection . . . these include ‘musical works’ and ‘sound recordings’”). 
 27 Id. 
 28 See Kimberly L. Craft, The Webcasting Music Revolution Is Ready to Begin, As Soon 
As We Figure Out the Copyright Law: The Story of the Music Industry at War with Itself, 24 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 4 (2001). 
 29 Webcaster II, supra note 26, at 24,086 (“The term . . . ‘sound recording’ results from 
‘the fixation of a series of musical, spoken or other sounds. A song that is sung and recorded 
will constitute a sound recording by the entity that records the performance, and a musical 
work by the songwriter.’”); see also Brian Day, Note, The Super Brawl: The History and 
Future of the Sound Recording Performance Right, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 
179, 183 (2009) (“Sound recording copyrights, on the other hand, are normally owned by 
the artist or record label and protect the originality of the recording itself as distinct from the 
underlying written lyrics or melody.”). 
 30 Webcaster II, supra note 26, at 24,086. 
 31 Craft, supra note 28, at 4 (“If a performance of the musical work happens to be 
broadcast over the airwaves such as by a radio station, each play is also worth money, in the 
form of royalties, to the songwriter and publisher.”); see also Jeremy Delibero, Copyright 
Arbitration Royalty Panels and the Webcasting Controversy: The Antithesis of Good Alter-
native Dispute Resolution, 5 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 83, 85 (2005) (“Within the Copyright 
Act, copyright owners enjoy an exclusive right of public performance. The copyright owner 
may recover royalties anytime a third party publicly performs the work. A public perfor-
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performance right.32 For example, when a radio station publicly broadcasts a 
song over the air, it pays a royalty to the holder of the musical work copyright, 
but not to the holder of the sound recording copyright.33 The principal protec-
tion afforded to owners of sound recording copyrights was a reproduction and 
distribution right, which granted compensation for the physical reproduction 
and sale of sound recordings (and prevented the unauthorized reproduction and 
distribution of recordings).34 This reproduction right was beneficial to sound 
recording copyright owners prior to the 1990s, when recorded songs were pri-
marily disseminated to consumers via the sale of physical records or CDs.35 
Broadcasters also argued that a performance right was unnecessary because 
radio airplay helped promote the sales of sound recordings.36 
 
A. The Digital Performance Rights Act 
 
In the 1990s, the emergence of digital communications technologies and the 
growth of the Internet dramatically altered the music landscape.37 In addition to 
purchasing cassettes or CDs, or tuning into AM/FM radio, listeners could ac-
cess music via digital satellite transmissions, Internet radio (“webcasters”), or 
cable music services.38 As digitally broadcast music began to take root, record 
                                                                                                                          
mance includes both the musical work and the sound recording . . . Unlike musical works, 
the owner of a sound recording (usually a record label) is not automatically entitled to per-
formance royalties under the Copyright Act.”). 
 32 Webcaster II, supra note 26, at 24,086 (“The performance right is granted to all cate-
gories of copyrighted works with one exception: Sound recordings. Thus, while the owner 
of a musical work enjoys the performance right, the owner of a sound recording does not.”). 
 33 See Craft, supra note 28, at 6 (“While radio broadcasters pay royalties to publishers 
and writers for use of the musical work, they have, however, never had to pay any sort of 
royalty or licensing fee to the actual record companies for use of the sound recording.”); see 
also Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 574 F.3d 748, 753 (D.C. Cir. 
2009) (“The copyright owners of musical works, but not those of sound recordings, have 
long enjoyed exclusive rights to public performances of their works.”) 
 34 Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391, 391 (1971). 
 35 Craft, supra note 28, at 5–6 (“Traditionally, the record companies have made money 
by selling copies of the sound recording, in form of vinyl albums, and later cassette tapes 
and CDs. The record companies then pay the musical artist a percentage of these sales (i.e., 
the artist’s royalties).”). 
 36 Day, supra note 29, at 184. 
 37 Delibero, supra note 31, at 86–87. 
 38 Id.; see also Eldar Haber, Copyrights in the Stream: The Battle on Webcasting, 28 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 769, 773 (2012) (“Webcasting is a digital 
transmission of creative work over a network that results in the playing of the work, without 
storing a permanent copy at the recipient’s end . . . Put simply, webcasting is listening to 
music or watching a video in ‘real time,’ instead of downloading a file and viewing or lis-
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labels, backed by both the Copyright Office and the Patent and Trademark Of-
fice, argued that the prevailing copyright structure would not adequately com-
pensate owners of sound recording copyrights.39 Congress was concerned that 
“certain types of subscription and interactive audio services might adversely 
affect sales of sound recordings and erode copyright owners’ ability to control 
and be paid for use of their work,” as well as about the potential for further 
erosion in the future from “pay-per-listen, audio-on-demand, or ‘dial-up’ ser-
vices for a particular recording or artist” (the so-called “celestial jukebox”).40 
In response to these concerns, Congress enacted the Digital Performance Right 
in Sound Recordings Act in 1995.41 
The DPRA granted the owners of sound recordings a right to compensation 
for performances of copyrighted works broadcast “by means of a digital audio 
transmission,” often referred to as the “digital performance right.”42 “Terrestri-
al” broadcasters, like AM and FM radio stations, that simulcast transmissions 
over the Internet were exempt.43 Non-subscription services—that is, those ser-
vices that are ad-supported—did not exist at the time.44 
While DPRA required digital music services to compensate copyright hold-
ers, it treated interactive services and non-interactive services very different-
ly.45 Because interactive services provide the ability to listen to a given song 
“on demand,” thus obviating the need to purchase a physical copy of a sound 
                                                                                                                          
tening to it after the downloading is complete or at any other time.”). 
 39 S. REP. NO. 104-128, at 11–13 (1995). 
 40 Id. at 15. 
 41 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act, Public Law 104–39, 109 Stat. 
336, 336 (1995). 
 42 See Beethoven.com LLC v. Librarian of Cong., 394 F.3d 939, 942 (D.C. Cir. 2005); 
see also Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc., v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 574 F.3d 748, 753 (D.C. 
Cir. 2009) (“In 1995, Congress passed the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings 
Act . . . granting the owners of sound recordings an exclusive right in performance ‘by 
means of a digital audio transmission.’”); Webcaster II, supra note 26, at 24,086. 
 43 S. REP. NO. 104-128, at 20. 
 44 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 § 3 (referring only to 
subscription transmissions); CARP Report, supra note 8, at 8 (discussing the dispute that 
arose over how to treat “webcasters who stream sound recordings on a nonsubscription ba-
sis” after DPRA was passed); S. REP. NO. 104-128, at 14 (noting that a small number of 
services have begun to make digital transmissions to “subscribers”); Olga Kharif, Coming 
Soon to XM: More Commercials, BUSINESSWEEK.COM (Apr. 12, 2006), 
http://commcns.org/1mQTBFe; see also Andrea Andelson, Tune in Your Favorite Radio 
Station on Your PC, Broadcast Entrepreneurs Hope Internet Can Give Life to Staid Indus-
try, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 24, 1996, at 5 (explaining when non-subscription ser-
vices materialized). 
 45 See Matt Jackson, From Broadcast to Webcast: Copyright Law and Streaming Media, 
11 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 447, 456 (2003). 
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recording, they arguably pose a more potent threat to music sales than non-
interactive services (which are more akin to radio).46 Thus, Congress estab-
lished an exclusive copyright for interactive services, allowing rights holders to 
negotiate freely in the market for such rights.47 
For non-interactive services (that is, radio services or “webcasters”), DPRA 
created a compulsory license granting users full access to record companies’ 
libraries of sound recordings.48 Royalty rates could still be voluntarily negotiat-
ed by the parties, but if they failed to agree, rates were set through binding ar-
bitration by a Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel convened by the Librarian 
of Congress, subject to his review and a right to appeal to the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals.49 
Notably, DPRA borrowed the substantive criteria for arbitrated royalty rates 
from a pre-existing four-part standard found in § 801(b)(1) of the Copyright 
Act of 1976.50 Specifically, § 801(b)(1) requires that royalty rates achieve four 
objectives: 
(A) To maximize the availability of creative works to the public; 
(B) To afford the copyright owner a fair return for his creative work and the 
copyright user a fair income under existing economic conditions; 
(C) To reflect the relative roles of the copyright owner and the copyright us-
er in the product made available to the public with respect to relative creative 
contribution, technological contribution, capital investment, cost, risk, and con-
tribution to the opening of new markets for creative expression and media for 
their communication; and 
(D) To minimize any disruptive impact on the structure of the industries in-
volved and on generally prevailing industry practices.51 
As discussed below, the first three criteria, standing alone, imply a standard 
that is similar to the market-based WBWS standard. However, the fourth crite-
                                                     
 46 Id. 
 47 Id.; see also Day, supra note 29, at 185. 
 48 See Amy Duvall, Royalty Rate-Setting for Webcasters: A Royal(ty) Mess, 15 MICH. 
TELECOMMS. & TECH. L. REV. 267, 270 n.20 (2008) (“The statutory license is compulsory 
because the user of the copyrighted work need not get individual permission from the copy-
right holder; their permission is automatically given if the user complies with the require-
ments of the statute.”). The requirements of the statutory licenses included limitations on the 
number of songs by a single artist or from a single album that could be played per hour, as 
well as a prohibition on releasing an advance playlist of upcoming songs. Id. at 270 n.20, 
271. 
 49 Webcaster I, supra note 10, at 45,242 (discussing the Librarians review powers under 
former § 802(f)–(g)); Duvall, supra note 48, at 271. 
 50 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1) (2012). 
 51 Id. 
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rion, requiring “non-disruption,” reflects a departure from the principle of 
market-based rates in favor of protecting licensees from potentially “disrup-
tive” changes in royalties.52 Today, only a handful of services remain subject to 
this anachronistic standard. 
 
B. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
 
The years immediately following passage of the DPRA saw the emergence 
of the Internet and the rapid growth of “streaming radio.”53 These new services 
were generally non-interactive and non-subscription, relying on advertising for 
revenue.54 Because advertising-supported services were not in existence at the 
time DPRA was passed, they were not covered by its compulsory license.55 In 
1998, Congress addressed this oversight by expanding the scope of the com-
pulsory license as part of the DMCA.56 The DMCA offered these new non-
interactive services the benefit of a statutory license (rather than requiring 
these services to negotiate licenses with individual sound recording copyright 
owners).57 
The DMCA divided non-interactive digital audio services into two groups.58 
The first group consisted of FCC-licensed satellite digital audio services 
(“SDARS”) that existed prior to July 31, 1998 (i.e., satellite radio companies 
                                                     
 52 Id. § 801(b)(1)(d). 
 53 See Richard D. Rose, Connecting the Dots: Navigating the Laws and Licensing Re-
quirements of the Internet Music Revolution, 42 IDEA 313, 317 (2002). 
 54 See, e.g., Webcaster I, supra note 10, at 45,258; Doc Searls, Why Are So Many Inter-
net Radio Stations Still on the Air?, LINUX J. (July 17, 2002), http://commcns.org/1n3Vv23; 
Growth and Development of Internet Radio, BBC, Nov. 20, 1998, at 1; Andelson, supra 
note 44, at 5. 
 55 See Day, supra note 29, at 187; see also Jackson, supra note 45, at 457 (“At the time 
the [DPRA] was written, webcasting was a nascent technology. By 1998, webcasting had 
proliferated with hundreds of radio stations and webcasters streaming music on the Internet. 
As Congress prepared to pass the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, the RIAA successfully 
lobbied to insert language to the provisions of the DPRA to close the ‘loophole’ that pre-
vented them from licensing non-subscription webcast performances.”); Craft, supra note 28, 
at 5, 12 (“The new technology, along with its various Internet applications, spread quickly. 
Suddenly, online-only webcasters were streaming digital music over the Internet – not mere-
ly on the envisioned subscription basis like satellite and cable companies, but also on a non-
subscription basis by means of paid advertisements, like ordinary radio programming.”). 
 56 Webcaster II, supra note 26, at 24,086. 
 57 See Craft, supra note 28, at 5, 15 (“This license would ease the burden of having to 
locate and pay all of the individual record companies that held the sound recording copy-
rights to the various musical selections transmitted.”). 
 58 H.R. REP. NO. 105-796, at 33, 38–39 (1998). 
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Sirius and XM) and three subscription services: DMX, Music Choice and Mu-
zak (called “Pre-Existing Subscription Services,” or “PSS”).59 Under the 
DMCA, PSS and SDARS were grandfathered in under the 801(b)(1) standard, 
under the theory that they had relied on the standard at the time.60 
The second group consisted of “new” digital subscription services and ser-
vices making “eligible non-subscription transmissions,” which included Inter-
net-only radio webcasters like Pandora and simulcasts of over-the-air broad-
casts.61 For these services, in the absence of a voluntary agreement between 
copyright holders and the webcasters, the DMCA directed that the rates for 
statutory licenses and royalties should be set by the CARP to “represent the 
rates and terms that would have been negotiated in the marketplace between a 
willing buyer and a willing seller” (this is the WBWS standard).62 
As discussed further below, Congress has intervened directly in the setting 
of webcaster royalties twice since passage of the DMCA, both times by pass-
                                                     
 59 See SDARS I, supra note 15, at 4080 n.3 (“Section 114(j)(11) of the Copyright Act 
defines the term ‘preexisting subscription service’ to mean ‘a service that performs sound 
recordings by means of noninteractive audio-only subscription digital audio transmissions, 
which was in existence and was making such transmissions to the public for a fee on or 
before July 31, 1998.”). 
 60 H.R. REP. NO. 105-796, at 89. 
 61 See Duvall, supra note 48, at 272 (“The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) 
addressed royalty payments for webcasters under Section 114. The DMCA adopted the 
statutory license for two types of webcasting: ‘preexisting subscription services’ and ‘eligi-
ble non-subscription services.’ These two categories included terrestrial radio stations’ 
online rebroadcasts as well as pure webcasters, but excluded providers who allowed users to 
download or select music of their choice.”). 
 62 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(1) (pre-existing services); see also id. §114(f)(2) (eligible 
non-subscription services and new subscription services). With respect to the WBWS stand-
ard, Congress directed that several considerations be taken into account. Section 
114(f)(2)(B) says: 
In determining such rates and terms, the copyright arbitration royalty 
panel shall base its decision on economic, competitive, and program-
ming information presented by the parties—including (i) whether use of 
the service may substitute for or may promote the sales of phonorecords 
or otherwise may interfere with or may enhance the sound record copy-
right owner’s other streams of revenue from its sound recordings; and 
(ii) the relative roles of the copyright owner and the transmitting entity 
in the copyrighted work and the service made available to the public 
with respect to relative creative contribution, technological contribution, 
capital investment, cost, and risk. 
Id. § 114(f)(2)(B); see also H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 105TH CONG., SECTION-BY-
SECTION ANALYSIS OF H.R. 2281 AS PASSED BY THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES ON AUGUST 4, 1998, at 57–59 (Comm. Print 1998). 
12 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS [Vol. 22 
ing legislation favorable to webcasters.63 In 2002, it passed the Small 
Webcasters Settlement Act of 2002, which “encouraged” record labels to nego-
tiate lower rates with small webcasters than had been set by the CARP in the 
Webcaster I proceeding.64 Then, in 2008 and 2009, Congress passed (and then 
extended) the Webcaster Settlement Act, which again “encouraged” rights 
holders to negotiate lower royalty rates, this time offering all webcasters a dis-
count from the rates set by the CRB in its 2007 Webcaster II decision.65 
Notably, neither the DPRA nor the DMCA extended the sound performance 
rights to the most prolific users of sound recordings, terrestrial radio stations.66 
In the late-2000s, however, Congress considered adopting legislation—the Per-
formance Rights Act of 2007 (H.R. 4789 and S. 2500)67 and its successor, the 
Performance Rights Act of 2009 (H.R. 848 and S. 379)68—which would have 
extended the sound recording right to terrestrial radio, established a compulso-
ry license for terrestrial radio stations, and adopted a single “fair market value” 
standard for all terrestrial broadcasters, cable, satellite and Internet services.69 
Specifically, as passed by both the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, § 
2 of the Performance Rights Act instructed the CRB to establish statutory rates 
under the first three prongs of § 801(b)(1),70 but rejected § 801(b)(1)(D), the 
non-disruption standard.71 Based on CRB precedent, the first three prongs of § 
                                                     
 63 See Notification of Agreement Under the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, 
68 Fed. Reg. 35,008, 35,008–09 (June 11, 2003). 
 64 Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-321, § 2, 116 Stat. 2780, 
2780 (2002) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 112, 114 (2012). 
 65 Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-36, 123 Stat. 1926 (2009) (codified as 
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 114) (extending the Webcaster Settlement Act); Webcaster Settle-
ment Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-435, 122 Stat. 4974 (2008) (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C. § 114) (extending the Webcaster Settlement Act in 2009). In addition, in 2004, Con-
gress passed the Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act (“CRDRA”), which im-
plemented procedural changes favored by webcasters and also law replaced the ad hoc 
CARP panels with a three-judge Copyright Royalty Board. Copyright Royalty and Distribu-
tion Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-419, § 3, 118 Stat. 2341, 2341–48 (2004) (codi-
fied at 17 U.S.C. §§ 801–02); see also ROBIN JEWELER, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: THE 
COPYRIGHT ROYALTY AND DISTRIBUTION REFORM ACT OF 2005, at 4 (2004), available at 
http://commcns.org/1jNdkRD. 
 66 See generally Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860; 
Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 
336 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2012)). 
 67 Performance Rights Act of 2007, H.R. 4789, S. 2500, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 68 Performance Rights Act of 2009, H.R. 848, S. 379, 111th Cong. 
 69 See generally Performance Rights Act of 2007, H.R. 4789, S. 2500, 110th Cong. § 2; 
Performance Rights Act of 2009, H.R. 848, S. 379, 111th Cong. § 2. 
 70 H.R. REP. NO. 111-680, at 14–15 (2010). 
 71 Id. at 14–15 (2010) (“The section further establishes rate standard parity among ter-
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801(b)(1) establish a market-based standard that is similar, if not identical, to 
the WBWS standard. Thus, the Performance Rights Act would have created a 
level playing field for all users of sound performance rights with rates set ei-
ther through voluntary negotiations or, where necessary, through a statutory 
license based on a market-based standard. 
 
III. THE SOUND RECORDING PERFORMANCE RIGHT IN 
PRACTICE 
 
Since passage of the DPRA and DMCA, sound recording performance cop-
yright holders and licensees have engaged in multiple rounds of negotiations 
over digital performance royalties, sometimes arriving at voluntary agree-
ments, but more commonly settling rates through litigated proceedings before 
the CARP and its successor, the CRB.72 
Since 1998, there have been three full-blown copyright royalty proceedings 
for non-pre-existing digital music services under the WBWS standard (known 
as Webcaster I, Webcaster II, and Webcaster III); in addition, as noted above, 
there have been two direct statutory interventions, the Small Webcaster Set-
tlement Act of 2002 and the Webcaster Settlement Acts of 2008 and 2009.73 As 
detailed in the first subsection below, the formal proceedings have involved 
extensive economic analysis, supported by literally dozens of industry and 
economic experts, with multiple layers of administrative and judicial review.74 
While the results of these proceedings have in many regards favored 
webcasters, webcasters have succeeded on more than one occasion in lobbying 
Congress to intervene in the process in favor of still lower rates. Thus the 
                                                                                                                          
restrial broadcasters, cable, satellite, and Internet services, by creating one rate standard for 
Copyright Royalty Judges (CRJs) to consider, regardless of the platform involved. The new 
standard will be the old 801(b) standard minus subpart (D).”). 
 72 In the meantime, of course, rights holders have also negotiated voluntary agreements 
with online interactive services, such as Spotify. Ben Sisario, Google Expected to Start a 
Competitor to Spotify, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2013, B9. As discussed below, these voluntarily 
negotiated rates have been used by the Copyright Royalty Board as the basis for setting 
compulsory license rates. 
 73 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 13,025 (Mar. 9, 2011) [hereinafter Webcaster III]; Digital Performance Right in Sound 
Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 70 Fed. Reg. 7970 (Feb. 16, 2005); Webcaster I, 
supra note 10. For Congress’ intervention, see the Webcaster Settlement Acts of 2002 and 
2009. See Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–36, 123 Stat. 1926; 
Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–435, 122 Stat. 4974; Small Webcaster 
Settlement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–321, 116 Stat. 2780. 
 74 See infra Part III.A. 
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IRFA was merely the latest in a string of efforts by webcasters to have royal-
ties set at below-market rates. 
In addition to the three Webcaster proceedings, there have been two formal 
proceedings (PSS I and SDARS I) to set rates for PSS and SDARS, and a sec-
ond (SDARS II) is underway.75 Rates in these proceedings have been set under 
the 801(b) standard and, as discussed in the second subsection below, demon-
strate that the 801(b) standard has resulted in rates below market-based levels. 




















                                                     
 75 Determination of Rates and Terms for Preexisting Subscription Services and Satellite 
Digital Audio Radio Services, 78 Fed. Reg. 23,053, 23,054 (Copyright Royalty Bd. Apr. 17, 
2013) [hereinafter SDARS II]; SDARS I, supra note 15, at 4080; Determination of Reasona-
ble Rates and Terms for the Digital Performance of Sound Recordings Services, 63 Fed. 
Reg. 25,394 (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel May 8, 1998) [hereinafter PSS I]. 
 76 The following review addresses the central issues in these proceedings and for copy-
right policy going forward, namely the terms and level of royalty rates for the primary sound 
performance right at issue. Each proceeding has also addressed a variety of ancillary issues, 
such as the rates for “ephemeral” recordings (which are digital copies made for the purpose 
of facilitating online music distribution), minimum fees applicable to smaller webcasters, 
the division of certain proceeds between studios and artists, and so forth. See, e.g., 
Webcaster III, supra note 73, at 13,026; Webcaster II, supra note 26, at 24,084; Webcaster 
I, supra note 10, at 45,240. No effort is made here to present a complete or comprehensive 
treatment of these ancillary issues. 
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TABLE 177 












 Non-Interactive Services 





2006–2010 WBWS Webcaster II May 2007 July 2009 
0.08¢ (2006) rising 
to 0.19¢ (2010) 
Per-
performance 





July 2009 n/a 
Greater of 25% of 
revenues or 0.08¢ 
(2006) rising to 
 0.14¢ (2015) 
Per-
performance 
2011–2015 WBWS Webcaster III March 2011 n/a 





Pre-existing Services (PSS and SDARS) 
1996–2000 801(b) PSS I May 1998 May 1999 6.5% Percentage of gross revenue 
2007–2012 801(b) SDARS I January 2008 July 2009 




2013–2017 801(b) SDARS II April 2013 n/a 
SDARS: 9% (2013) 
rising to 11% (2017) 




                                                     
77 Non-subscription webcasting rates for 1998–2002 were the result of the 
Webcaster I proceeding. See Webcaster I, supra note 10. Rates for non-
subscription webcasting for 2003 to 2004, and rates for subscription webcasting for 
1998–2004 were settled. See Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and 
Ephemeral Recordings, 68 Fed. Reg. 23,241 (May 1, 2003); see also Digital Per-
formance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 69 Fed. Reg. 
8822 (Feb. 26, 2004); Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and 
Ephemeral Recordings, 69 Fed. Reg. 5693 (Feb. 6, 2004); Digital Performance 
Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 68 Fed. Reg. 50,493 (Aug. 
21, 2003); Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Record-
ings, 68 Fed. Reg. 27,506 (May 20, 2003). Rates for 2005 were the result of an 
extension of the 2004 rates in the Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act. 
See Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004 § 6(b)(3); Digital Per-
formance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 70 Fed. Reg. 
6736 (Feb. 8, 2005) (terminating the pending proceedings). 
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A. Webcaster Rates and the Willing Buyer/Willing Seller Standard 
 
As noted above, there have been three full-blown rate proceedings to estab-
lish rates for Internet-only webcasters and simulcasters since 1998. Each time, 
the adjudicating body—first a CARP, then the CRB78—held extensive hear-
ings, took testimony from numerous expert economic and industry witnesses, 
engaged in full briefing schedules, and issued a written decision explaining the 
basis for the resulting rates; each decision has been subject to appeal before the 
D.C. Circuit.79 Nevertheless, each decision has led to complaints by 
webcasters, who have lobbied Congress to intervene and set lower rates.80 In-
deed, most webcasters today are paying royalty rates negotiated pursuant to the 
Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009, which are below the market-based rates 
established by the CRB in the Webcaster II proceeding.81 This subsection de-




                                                     
 78 In 2004, Congress passed the Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 
2004, which phased out the Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel replacing it with the Copy-
right Royalty Board. Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 
108-419, § 3, 118 Stat. 2341, 2341–48. 
 79 Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 
2012) (appealing Webcaster III); Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 
574 F.3d 748 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (appealing Webcaster II); Beethoven.com LLC v. Librarian 
of Cong., 394 F.3d 939 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (appealing Webcaster I). 
 80 See cases cited supra note 79. 
 81 See generally Notification of Agreements under the Webcaster Settlement Act of 
2009, 74 Fed. Reg. 34,796 (July 17, 2009) [hereinafter 2009 Webcaster Settlement]; Notifi-
cation of Agreements under the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008, 74 Fed. Reg. 9293 (Mar. 
3, 2009) [hereinafter 2008 Webcaster Settlement]. See David Oxenford, Pureplay 
Webcasters and SoundExchange Enter into Deal under Webcaster Settlement Act to Offer 
Internet Radio Royalty Rate Alternative for 2006-2015, BROADCAST L. BLOG (July 7, 2009), 
http://commcns.org/1fD7BbS (noting that the settlement by “SoundExchange and a group of 
webcasters that [the author] represented in the [CRB] proceeding . . . not only reaches back 
to set rates different, and substantially lower, than those that were arrived at by the CRB for 
the period from 2006–2010, but also resolves the rates for 2011-2015”); see also Manuel 
Roig-Franzia, Pandora’s Keeper, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2013, at C1 (“In 2007, a federal 
panel—the [CRB]—issued a ruling that would have raised the royalty rate paid by 
webcasters so high that it would have forced them out of business. Drama ensued . . . What 
resulted was a deal: Pandora, other music streamers, performers and the recording industry 
agreed to a new set of rates.”); Sarah McBride, Royalty Plan Is Set for Online Radio, WALL 
ST. J., July 8, 2009, at B8; John Timmer, Pandora Lives! SoundExchange Cuts Deal on 
Webcasting Rates, ARS TECHNICA (July 7, 2009), http://commcns.org/1i8joa1. 
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1. Webcaster I 
 
The Webcaster I proceeding began on November 27, 1998, after a six-month 
voluntary negotiation period between webcasters and the RIAA resulted in a 
number of agreements between individual webcasters and the record compa-
nies, but failed to produce an industry-wide agreement.82 In accordance with 
the DMCA, a CARP was convened to establish the rates and terms for a statu-
tory license.83 Its report, recommending royalty rates for the period from Octo-
ber 28, 1998 through December 31, 2002, was released more than three years 
later, on February 20, 2002.84 
The CARP proceeding was extensive by any standard. It included a full cy-
cle of direct and rebuttal testimony, with 49 economic and industry expert wit-
nesses presenting direct testimony and 26 on rebuttal, as well as oral arguments 
and multiple rounds of briefs.85 The resulting record was “one of the most vo-
luminous records in CARP history,” including a “written transcript of over 
15,000 pages, many thousands of pages of exhibits, and over 1,000 pages of 
post-hearing submissions” by counsel.86 
In reaching its decision, the CARP grappled with and resolved a number of 
highly technical legal and economic questions, many of which were resolved 
in favor of webcasters. For example, under the statute, the CARP concluded 
that the WBWS standard was created to set rates and terms “that would have 
been negotiated” been a willing buyer and a willing seller in a “hypothetical 
marketplace” in which no compulsory licenses existed and rates were deter-
mined by negotiations between music services and copyright holders.87 While 
the parties agreed that the willing “buyers” in this context were non-interactive 
digital music services, they disagreed as to the identities of the hypothetical 
                                                     
 82 See Webcaster I, supra note 10, at 45,241. 
 83 Id. at 45,240. 
 84 Id. at 45,241 (discussing the CARP proceeding); Randall C. Picker, Copyright As 
Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 423, 462 (2002) (dis-
cussing the February 20, 2002 report by the CARP). 
 85 CARP Report, supra note 8, at 11–15 (describing the hearings). 
 86 CARP Report, supra note 8, at 18; see also ROBIN JEWELER, CRS REPORT FOR 
CONGRESS, COPYRIGHT LAW: STATUTORY ROYALTY RATES FOR WEBCASTERS 3 (last updated 
Nov. 18, 2003) (“In a lengthy opinion based upon thousands of pages of testimony and evi-
dence, the CARP recommended a public performance fee of 0.14¢ per performance and an 
ephemeral license fee of 9% of performance fees due for Internet transmissions by qualify-
ing webcasters and commercial broadcasters.”). 
 87 CARP Report, supra note 8, at 21 (internal quotation marks omitted); Allison Kidd, 
The Beginning of the End of the Internet Radio Royalty Dispute, 9 J. INTERNET L. 15, 18 
(2005). 
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“sellers.”88 
The RIAA, representing the interests of the copyright holders (i.e., record 
companies), asserted that the seller in the hypothetical marketplace should con-
sist of “a single collective of sound recording copyright owners (such as 
RIAA), offering a blanket license” for access to the sound record libraries of 
its members.89 In contrast, the music services argued that in a hypothetical 
marketplace where compulsory licenses did not exist, a single RIAA-like entity 
could not negotiate on record companies’ behalf. This is because the antitrust 
exemption granted to RIAA, which allowed it to bargain on behalf of the col-
lective, was conditional on the compulsory nature of the licenses at issue.90 The 
Services—a collection of Webcasters, Broadcasters, and similar organiza-
tions—contended that a single RIAA-like entity in the hypothetical market-
place would wield market power sufficient to distort negotiations.91 Instead, the 
services proposed that the “sellers” in the WBWS market be comprised of a 
“non-trivial number” of smaller collectives, offering blanket licenses in com-
petition with one another.92 Ultimately, the CARP rejected both proposals, 
concluding instead that the appropriate “sellers” in the hypothetical market-
place were neither a single collective nor a number of smaller collectives, but 
rather individual record companies, offering “blanket licenses for each record 
company’s repertory of sound recordings.”93 From the perspective of the 
webcasters, this was a highly favorable result, as it meant that rates were based 
on the assumption that all copyright owners were competing against one an-
                                                     
 88 CARP Report, supra note 8, at 21. 
 89 Id. at 21–22. 
 90 Id. at 23. The CARP Report said: 
We recognize that the hypothetical marketplace we seek to replicate 
would operate more efficiently, with lower transactional costs, if a 
single collective designated by the services could negotiate with a 
single collective designated by the record companies. Even if such 
negotiations were non-exclusive, Congress clearly perceived antitrust 
concerns with such an arrangement. Congress authorized antitrust ex-
emptions respecting such negotiations only within the context of 
compulsory licenses. 
Id. 
 91 Id. at 22 (“The Services’ perception of the sellers, in the hypothetical marketplace 
envisaged by Congress, is starkly different. They assert that RIAA’s vision ‘would eviscer-
ate the protections sought by the Justice Department and implemented by Congress to pre-
vent the exercise of market power [by the RIAA or the record companies].’”). The CARP 
Report uses “Services” to refer to “Webcaster, Broadcasters, and the business Establishment 
Services.” Id. at 2 n.2. 
 92 Id. at 22. 
 93 Id. at 44. 
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other in the marketplace rather than being represented jointly by bargaining 
agents.94 
In addition, the CARP concluded that the WBWS standard did not necessi-
tate any ex post adjustments of the royalty rates it determined based on the 
“additional factors” enumerated in § 114(f)(2)(B), finding that these factors 
would already be “fully reflected in any agreements actually negotiated be-
tween webcasters and copyright owners in the relevant marketplace.”95 
In the course of this extensive proceeding, RIAA and the music services 
presented competing proposals for determining royalty rates, each backed by 
expert testimony.96 RIAA proposed basing rates on the agreements negotiated 
between the RIAA and 26 separate webcasters during the voluntary bargaining 
period, 97 noting that those agreements involved “the same buyer, the same 
seller, the same right, the same copyrighted works, the same time period, and 
the same medium as those in the marketplace that the CARP must replicate.”98 
Webcasters, on the other hand, proposed rates derived from a theoretical model 
which attempted to estimate appropriate royalty rates for the sound recording 
right based on rates for musical work performance rights established between 
music publishers and over-the-air-radio broadcasters.99 
The CARP ultimately decided that the webcasters’ theoretical model was 
unreliable, in part because of intrinsic differences between the musical work 
performance right and the sound recording performance right.100 Moreover, it 
concluded, “the quest to derive rates which would have been negotiated in the 
hypothetical willing buyer/willing seller marketplace is best based on a review 
of actual marketplace agreements, if they involve comparable rights and com-
parable circumstances.”101 Taking multiple factors into account, the CARP 
concluded that while 25 of the 26 agreements that had been negotiated by 
                                                     
 94 Id. at 46 (explaining that “as it meant that rates were based on the assumption that all 
copyright owners were competing against one another in the marketplace rather than being 
represented jointly by bargaining agents”). 
 95 Id. at 35 (emphasis in original). 
 96 Id. at 38. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 99 Id. at 28, 38 (“Accordingly, Webcasters calculated their proposed per-performance 
and per-hour sound recording performance fee by extrapolation from the aggregate fees paid 
to ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC by over-the-air radio stations holding blanket performance 
licenses.”). 
 100 Id. at 40 (“The Panel is uncomfortable with many of these assumptions and the cumu-
lative effect casts significant doubt on the reliability of the ultimate conclusions. The Panel 
finds that this theoretical construct suffers serious deficiencies.”). 
 101 Id. at 43. 
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RIAA were “unreliable benchmarks,”102 the freely negotiated agreement with 
Yahoo! was “evidence of an entirely different character,”103 reflecting “a truly 
arms-length bargaining process on a level playing field between two major 
players of comparable skill, size, and economic power.”104 Thus, based largely 
on the Yahoo! agreement, the CARP set a statutory performance royalty rate of 
0.14¢ per performance for Internet-only (“IO”) webcasters.105 
In adopting the per performance rate structure, the CARP rejected argu-
ments that it should set rates as a percentage of licensees’ revenues.106 The 
CARP found that the per-performance structure was superior because (1) a per-
performance metric is directly reflective of the right being licensed; (2) per-
centage-of-revenue models are difficult to implement because relevant 
webcaster revenues are complex; and, (3) many webcasters are small and do 
not generate much revenue, so that the adoption of a percent-of-revenue model 
could result in copyright owners receiving little or no compensation for the use 
of their material.107 
The CARP also grappled with the issue of whether webcasters promoted 
music sales, especially in the context of radio retransmissions (i.e., copyrighted 
material contained in Internet retransmissions of broadcast radio signals).108 
The CARP could not determine whether webcasters created a net increase or 
net decrease in the sale of phonorecords, despite the “undisputed testimony 
that traditional over-the-air radio play has a tremendous promotional impact on 
phonorecord sales” and the absence of evidentiary support for concluding that 
the impact of Internet simulcasts was any less significant.109 The CARP set a 
lower Radio Retransmission (“RR”) rate of 0.07¢.110 
                                                     
 102 Id. at 60. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 61; see also Duvall, supra note 48, at 273–74 (“To determine the rates that 
would have been negotiated in the marketplace under the per performance model, CARP 
reviewed actual royalty agreements to comply with its statutory obligations under the 
DMCA. It found that the RIAA/Yahoo! agreement provided an appropriate benchmark for 
the rate-setting because it was the only RIAA-negotiated agreement ‘to reflect a truly arms-
length bargaining process on a level playing field between two major players of comparable 
skill, size, and economic power.’”). 
 105 Webcaster I, supra note 10, at 45,243. 
 106 Id. at 45,243. 
 107 See CARP Report, supra note 8, at 37. The CARP also recommended a minimum 
royalty fee of $500 per annum. Id. at 95. 
 108 Id. at 32–34. 
 109 Id. at 74–75. The CARP did not conclude that there was no promotion, the CARP 
limited said that the evidence was insufficient to persuade them either way. Id. at 33–34. 
 110 Recent Legislation, Copyright Law—Congress Responds to Copyright Arbitration 
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As provided for under the DPRA, the CARP’s findings were reviewed by 
the Register of Copyrights and the Librarian of Congress (“LOC”).111 In its 
Final Rule and Order, released on July 8, 2002,112 the LOC—after reviewing 
briefs filed by both sides—upheld the CARP’s determination regarding the 
definition of the participants in the relevant hypothetical marketplace.113 How-
ever, the LOC ruled that the CARP erred when the CARP set royalty rates that 
were higher for Internet-only webcasters than rates for radio retransmissions.114 
While the LOC accepted that the RIAA’s agreements with webcasters served 
as a more reasonable benchmark than the webcasters’ proposed “theoretical 
model,” it lowered the IO webcasting rate from 0.14¢ per-performance to 
0.07¢ per-performance115 (to match the royalty rate for RR entities).116 Thus, the 
LOC cut the per-performance rate set by the CARP for pureplay webcasters, 
which was based on the actual rate agreed to by RIAA and Yahoo!, by 50%.117 
The LOC’s decision also contained important language concerning the dis-
tinction between the 801(b) and WBWS standards. The two standards, it con-
cluded, were not the same. Rather, the 801(b) standard is “policy-driven, 
whereas the standard for setting rates for non-subscription services set forth in 
§ 114(f)(2)(B) is strictly fair market value—willing buyer/willing seller,” 
therefore, the two rates cannot be equal as a matter of law.118 
The LOC’s ruling was upheld on appeal by the D.C. Circuit Court in Bee-
thoven.com LLC.119 However, even before the appeal was decided, Congress—
heeding complaints from small webcasters that the rates (even after being cut 
in half by the LOC) were too high—stepped in by passing the Small 
Webcasters Settlement Act of 2002,120 which “gave noncommercial and small 
commercial webcasters additional time to negotiate,”121 and expressed to copy-
right owners “the strong encouragement of Congress to reach an accommoda-
tion with the small webcasters on an expedited basis.”122 Shortly thereafter, the 
                                                                                                                          
Royalty Panel’s Webcasting Rates, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1920, 1923 (2003). 
 111 CARP Report, supra note 8, at 7. 
 112 Webcaster I, supra note 10, at 45,240. 
 113 Id. at 45,244–45. 
 114 Id. at 45,243. 
 115 Id. 
 116 See Duvall, supra note 48, at 275–76. 
 117 See Webcaster I, supra note 10, at 45,241, 45,243. 
 118 See id. at 45,241 (emphasis added). 
 119 Beethoven.com LLC v. Librarian of Cong., 394 F.3d 939, 954 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 120 H.R. REP. NO. 111–139, at 2 (2009). 
 121 Day, supra note 29, at 188–89. 
 122 Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-321, § 2(3), 116 Stat. 
2780, 2780 (“The representatives have arrived at an agreement that they can accept in the 
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small webcasters reached a compromise agreement with RIAA setting royalty 
rates that were capped as a percentage of small webcasters’ revenues or ex-
penses rather than calculated on a per-performance basis.123 
 
2. Webcaster II 
 
The next statutory license proceeding for webcaster royalty rates, covering 
the period 2006–2010, established rates through another formal rate proceed-
ing, this one lasting more than two years, from February 2005 until May 
2007,124 this time under the purview of the CRB, the successor to the CARP 
panel.125 The Webcaster II proceeding again involved direct and rebuttal testi-
mony from dozens of expert witnesses, including formal hearings, hundreds of 
motions and pleadings, and over 13,000 pages of transcripts.126 
As in Webcaster I, the CRB evaluated several proposed benchmarks for roy-
alty rates proposed by copyright owners and webcasters, again embracing an 
approach based on rates for comparable rights that had been negotiated freely 
in the marketplace.127 Specifically, the CRB embraced a model proposed by 
SoundExchange’s economic expert, Dr. Michael Pelcovits. Termed the “Inter-
active Webcasting Market Benchmark,”128 the model utilized the royalty rates 
negotiated individually between copyright owners and interactive music ser-
vices (adjusted for differences in interactivity) as a basis for royalties for non-
                                                                                                                          
extraordinary and unique circumstances here presented, specifically as to the small 
webcasters, their belief in their inability to pay the fees due pursuant to the July 8 order, and 
as to the copyright owners of sound recordings and performers, the strong encouragement of 
Congress to reach an accommodation with the small webcasters on an expedited basis.”). 
 123 See Notification of Agreement Under the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, 
67 Fed. Reg. 78,510, 78,511 (Dec. 24, 2002) (observing that rates were set at 10% of reve-
nues up to $250,000, 12% of revenues above $250,000, or seven% of expenses, whichever 
was greater). 
 124 Webcaster II, supra note 26, at 24,084; see also Digital Performance Right in Sound 
Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 70 Fed. Reg. 7970, 7970 (Feb. 16, 2005) (announc-
ing the commencement of the proceedings). 
 125 In the interim, Congress had passed the Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform 
Act in 2004, which replaced the ad hoc CARP panels with a permanent Copyright Royalty 
Board. See Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-114, § 
3, 118 Stat. 2341, 2341. 
 126 Webcaster II, supra note 26, at 24,085 (“In addition to the written direct statements 
and written rebuttal statements, the Copyright Royalty Judges heard 48 days of testimony, 
which filled 13,288 pages of transcript, and 192 exhibits were admitted. The docket contains 
475 entries of pleadings, motions and orders.”). 
 127 See id. 
 128 Id. at 24,092. 
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interactive services under compulsory licenses.129 Based largely on the interac-
tive services benchmark, the CRB set per-performance rates at 0.08¢ for 2006, 
rising gradually to 0.19¢ in 2010,130 as shown in Table 2. Thus, under 
Webcaster II, the statutory rate was scheduled to reach the 0.14¢ per perfor-




STATUTORY ROYALTY RATES FOR COMMERCIAL 
WEBCASTERS UNDER WEBCASTER II 
Year Per-Performance    Royalty 
2006 0.08¢  
2007 0.11¢  
2008 0.14¢  
2009 0.18¢  
2010 0.19¢  
 
The CRB’s decision was appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, in 
Intercollegiate Broadcast System v. Copyright Royalty Board.133 The Court 
upheld the CRB’s determination of royalty rates for commercial webcasters, 
including specifically its decision to base royalties on the market-based inter-
active services benchmark.134 The Court also rejected the webcasters’ asser-
tions that the rates set by the CRB were “crushing and disproportionate.”135 The 
                                                     
 129 See Duvall, supra note 48, at 279. The CRB also concurred in the Webcaster I deter-
mination that the preferred metric for calculating statutory royalties is a per-performance 
model, as opposed to royalties based on a percentage-of-revenue. Webcaster II, supra note 
26, at 24,090. 
 130 See Webcaster II, supra note 26, at 24,096. 
 131 Compare Webcaster I, supra note 10, at 45,243 (rejecting the “proposed rates ($0.14 
per performance for Internet-only transmission and $0.07 per performance for radio re-
transmissions) for the section 114 license and substitut[ing] [the Librarian’s] own determi-
nation ([$0.0007] per performance for both types of transmissions)”), with Webcaster II, 
supra note 26, at 24,096 (setting rates at $0.0014 for 2008). 
 132 Adapted from information in Webcaster II. See Webcaster II, supra note 26, at 
24,096. 
 133 See Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 574 F.3d 748, 752 
(D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 134 Id. at 758. 
 135 Id. at 760. The Court did, however, vacate the $500 minimum fee for both commer-
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court found that the WBWS standard does not require to the CRB to set rates 
that allow all firms in the market to earn a profit: 
Finally, it was not error for the Judges to reject the small commercial 
webcasters’ pleas that paying per performance would wreck their inefficient 
business models. The Judges made clear they could not “guarantee a profitable 
business to every market entrant.” The Judges are not required to preserve the 
business of every participant in a market. They are required to set rates and 
terms that “most clearly represent the rates and terms that would have been 
negotiated in the marketplace between a willing buyer and a willing seller.” 17 
U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B). If small commercial webcasters cannot pay the same 
rate as other willing buyers and still earn a profit, then the Judges are not re-
quired to accommodate them.136 
Thus, the court ruled, while webcasters are guaranteed access to sound re-
cording performance rights under a compulsory license, Congress did not ex-
tend to them a right to perpetual profitability.137 
 
3. The Webcaster Settlement Act and the 2009 Compromise 
 
As with Webcaster I, many webcasters reacted negatively to the Webcaster 
II decision.138 Pandora and others claimed that the CRB’s royalty rates would 
push webcasters to the verge of collapse,139 with Pandora asserting that the 
CRB rates would force it to pay almost 70% of its revenues in performance 
royalties.140 
As in 2002, Congress reacted sympathetically to webcasters’ complaints,141 
this time by passing the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008 and later the 
Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009 (together, the “WSAs”).142 Modeled on the 
Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, the WSAs expressed to copyright 
                                                                                                                          
cial and non-commercial webcasters, remanding those portions of the CRB’s ruling for re-
consideration. Id. at 762. 
 136 Id. at 761 (internal citations omitted). 
 137 See id. 
 138 Duvall, supra note 48, at 283. 
 139 See Day, supra note 29, at 190–91 (“The reaction to the CRB rates was immediate 
and dramatic. Small and large webcasters alike predicted the CRB rates would result in the 
‘end of Internet Radio.’ For instance, Pandora Internet Radio . . . maintained that it was ‘on 
the verge of collapse’ as a result of the new rates.”). 
 140 See Day, supra note 29 (citing a prepared statement by Pandora Media, Inc.). 
 141 See Elahe Izadi, Pandora, Growing Up Washington Style, NAT’L J. (July 9, 2012), 
http://commcns.org/1gNQ6Ie. 
 142 See Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-435, 122 Stat. 4974; 
Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-36, 123 Stat. 1926. 
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owners “the strong encouragement of Congress to reach an accommodation 
with the webcasters on an expedited basis,”143 and provided a window of time 
in which to do so.144 Not surprisingly, rights holders entered into negotiations 
with webcasters over lower rates, reaching eight separate agreements (contain-
ing a total of twelve royalty schedules) with different segments of the webcast-
ing market—for example, non-commercial webcasters, non-commercial educa-
tional webcasters, and pureplay webcasters—in late 2008 and early 2009.145 
The new rates, which were available to qualified webcasters on an opt-in basis, 
overrode the market-based Webcaster II rates established by the CRB for 
webcasters that elected the alternate rates, and generally covered the ten-year 
period from 2006–2015.146 Table 3 shows the alternate schedule of rates for 
Pureplay webcasters, which are substantially lower than the rates determined 
by the CRB in Webcaster II. For example, the royalty rate per-performance 
under Webcaster II in 2010 would have been 0.19¢, while the WSA Pureplay 
rate is only 0.097¢.147 And, the 0.14¢ originally recommended by the CARP in 
Webcaster I to take effect in 1998, and delayed under Webcaster II until 2008, 







                                                     
 143 See Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-321, § 2, 116 Stat. 2780, 
2780. 
 144 See Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-435, 122 Stat. 4974. The 
original deadline for negotiations, Feb. 15, 2009, was extended through July 2009 by the 
Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-36, 123 Stat. 1926. See 155 CONG. REC. 
S6740 (2009) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy). 
 145 See 2008 Webcaster Settlement, supra note 81, at 9294 (listing agreements between 
SoundExchange and various webcasters). 
 146 See 2009 Webcaster Settlement, supra note 81, at 34,798. 
 147 Webcaster II, supra note 26, at 24,096 (setting the per-play rate applicable to Com-
mercial Webcasters at 0.19¢ for 2010); 2009 Webcaster Settlement, supra note 81, at 34,799 
(setting the per-play rate applicable to Commercial Webcasters at 0.097¢ for 2010). 
 148 Webcaster I, supra note 10, at 45,273 (setting the per-play rate for all internet trans-
missions by Webcasters and Commercial Broadcasters at $0.0007 per performance); 
Webcaster II, supra note 26, at 24,096 (setting the per play rate applicable to Commercial 
Webcasters at $0.0014 for 2008); 2009 Webcaster Settlement, supra note 81, at 34,799 (set-
ting the per-play rate applicable to Commercial Webcasters at $0.0014 for 2015). 
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TABLE 3149 
ROYALTY RATES FOR PUREPLAY WEBCASTERS 
UNDER THE 2009 WEBCASTER SETTLEMENT ACT COMPROMISE 
 
Year  Per-Performance Royalty 
2006 0.08¢ 
2007 0.084¢  
2008 0.088¢  
2009 0.093¢  
2010 0.097¢  
2011 0.102¢  
2012 0.11¢  
2013 0.12¢  
2014 0.13¢  
2015 0.14¢  
 
Importantly, Congress directed the LOC to make it clear that the Webcaster 
Settlement Act rates were not to be interpreted as “market based.”150 To high-
light that fact, Congress unequivocally stated in § 114(f)(5)(C) that the new 
rates were to be considered the result of unique circumstances and, specifical-
ly, were not precedential with respect to the WBWS standard: 
It is the intent of Congress that any royalty rates, rate structure, definitions, 
terms, conditions, or notice and recordkeeping requirements, included in such 
agreements shall be considered as a compromise motivated by the unique busi-
ness, economic and political circumstances of webcasters, copyright owners, 
and performers rather than as matters that would have been negotiated in the 
marketplace between a willing buyer and a willing seller.151 
Thus, the rates currently being paid by webcasters like Pandora are not mar-
ket based, but rather the result of a compromise that set rates below those es-
                                                     
 149 2009 Webcaster Settlement, supra note 81, at 34,799. 
 150 See id. at 34,801 (noting that the Rates and Terms shall be considered a compromise 
motivated by the unique circumstances, and the Rates and Terms cannot be represented as 
market rates in any proceeding). 
 151 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(5)(C) (emphasis added). 
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tablished by the CRB under the WBWS standard.152 The compromise extends 
the term of the agreement through 2015.153 Lastly, the compromise requires 
large pureplay webcasters to pay the greater of 25% of revenues or the agreed 
upon per play rates.154 
 
4. Webcaster III 
 
While rates for 2011–2015 were established for most webcasters by the var-
ious Webcaster Settlement Act compromises, the CRB was still required to 
hold a new royalty rate proceeding to set statutory rates and terms for the 
2011–2015 period that such rates would apply to webcasters that were not in 
existence at the time of the Webcaster Settlement Act or chose not to opt-in to 
one of the WSA rate schedules.155 Despite the fact that most webcasters did not 
participate in the proceeding, the Webcaster III proceeding involved extensive 
direct and reply testimony from numerous experts from all sides, full briefing 
schedules, and so forth. 
Applying the WBWS standard, the CRB once again (as in Webcaster II) set 
rates by reference to a benchmark based on the rates negotiated between rights 
holders and interactive digital services, which are not subject to the compulso-
ry copyright and thus are prima facie market-based.156 The CRB released its 
rate determinations on March 9, 2011,157 with rates again established on a per-








                                                     
 152 See 2009 Webcaster Settlement, supra note 81, at 34,796–99 (describing statutory 
rates which webcasters may elect to pay). 
 153 Id. at 34,799. 
 154 Id. 
 155 See generally Webcaster III, supra note 73. The Webcaster III proceeding began on 
January 9, 2009, and thus overlapped negotiations then underway under the Webcaster Set-
tlement Act. Those negotiated resulted in voluntary agreements among many of the parties 
for which rates would have otherwise been determined under Webcaster III. 
 156 Id. at 13,031 (noting that royalty adjustments were made based on the non-interactive 
nature of the licenses under consideration). 
 157 Id. at 13,047–48. 
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TABLE 4158 
STATUTORY ROYALTY RATES FOR 
COMMERCIAL WEBCASTERS UNDER WEBCASTER III 
Year Per-Performance Royalty 
2011 0.19¢  
2012 0.21¢  
2013 0.21¢  
2014 0.23¢  




Figure 1 below illustrates the disparity between the royalty rates determined 
by the CARP and CRB under the WBWS standard in the Webcaster I, 
Webcaster II and Webcaster III proceedings and the royalty rates actually paid 
by pureplay webcasters. The blue line in Figure 1 represents the original royal-
ty rates set by the CARP and the CRB, which applied the WBWS standard 
after extensive proceedings in which economic evidence was used to estimate a 
market-based rate. The red line represents the final royalty rates actually 
charged to webcasters after their appeals to the Librarian of Congress for 










                                                     
 158 Derived from information in Webcaster III. See id. at 13,048. 
 159 Note that rates negotiated by small webcasters under the Small Webcaster Settlement 
Act, which were expressed as a share of revenues rather than on a per-performance basis, 
are not shown. 
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FIGURE 1: COMPARISON OF INITIAL AND FINAL WEBCASTER ROYALTY 
RATES, 1998–2015 
 
As Figure 1 shows, some pureplay webcasters (including Pandora) have se-
cured per-performance royalty rates well below the market-based rates man-
dated by Congress under the DMCA. 
 
C. Section 801(b) and the “Non-Disruption” Standard 
 
Unlike the WBWS standard, the 801(b) standard now being advocated by 
webcasters is explicitly not market-based—that it, it is not designed to repli-
cate the rates that would be achieved in a competitive market.160 Rather, the 
                                                     
 160 See Written Direct Statement of Music Choice at 13–15, In re Determination of Rates 
and Terms for Preexisting Subscription and Satellite Digital Audio Radio Services, No. 
2011-1 CRB PSS/Satellite II (Copyright Royalty Bd., Nov. 29, 2011) [hereinafter Direct 
Statement of Music Choice], available at http://commcns.org/1fD7m6s (arguing simultane-
ously that current rates will result in petitioner Music Choice’s demise and that there are no 
similar market benchmarks on which to base royalty rate). 
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fourth pillar of the 801(b) standard reflects Congress’ desire that rates be set so 
as to “minimize” any “disruptive” impact on the parties; that is, if market-
based rates are determined to be disruptive for licensees, they must be low-
ered.161 From a policy perspective, the “non-disruption” standard may result in 
locking in place inefficient or obsolete business models, or even encouraging 
inefficient investments by firms which know that, under the 801(b) standard, 
rates will be set so as to prevent “disruption” to their business models. For li-
censees and their investors, such a guarantee is obviously quite valuable. 
This subsection briefly reviews the application of the 801(b) standard since 
its adoption in the 1976 Copyright Act, focusing on proceedings involving 
royalty rates for SDARS services, SDARS I (completed in 2008) and SDARS II. 
In SDARS I, the non-disruption criterion played an important role, leading di-
rectly to rates lower than would have been reached under the WBWS stand-
ard.162 And, while the SDARS II proceeding is not yet complete, the expert eco-
nomic testimony presented there demonstrates that, at least in the eyes of copy-
right users, the non-disruption criterion amounts to a guaranteed return on in-
vestment for licensees, now and into the future.163 Before addressing the two 
SDARS proceedings, it is useful to review briefly the three prior proceedings 
in which the 801(b) standard was applied. 
 
1. Early Interpretations of the 801(b) Standard 
 
Prior to the creation of the Copyright Royalty Board, the 801(b) standard 
was applied twice by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal (“CRT”) in 1981, and 
once by CARP in 1997.164 The two CRT proceedings involved the statutory 
licenses for jukeboxes and for the mechanical license, that is, the right to use a 
musical composition when making a copy of a sound recording.165 As the CRB 
                                                     
 161 See 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1)(D) (requiring one function of the Copyright Royalty Judg-
es while making royalty determinations is to minimize any disruptive impact on the struc-
ture of the industries involved in rate setting). 
 162 See SDARS I, supra note 15, at 4097 (describing considerations of the analysis of the 
“minimizing disruption” factor). 
 163 See Direct Statement of Music Choice, supra note 160, at 44–45 (arguing that royal-
ties have been so disruptive as to cause the failure of competing firms, thus compelling the 
Board to set a lower rate). 
 164 See generally Letter from Mark L. Goldstein, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, 
to Sen. Arlen Specter (Aug. 4, 2010), available at http://commcns.org/NOsieF. 
 165 1980 Adjustment of the Royalty Rate for Coin-Operated Phonorecord Players, 46 
Fed. Reg. 884, 885 (Jan. 5, 1981); Adjustment of Royalty Payable under Compulsory Li-
cense for Making and Distributing Phonorecords; Rates and Adjustment of Rates, 46 Fed. 
Reg. 10,466, 10,467 (Feb. 3, 1981). 
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later noted, in the 1980 Jukebox License Proceeding,166 neither the CRT nor the 
D.C. Circuit, which reviewed the decision on appeal, substantively dealt with 
the 801(b) standard as such.167 The CRT’s decision in the 1981 Mechanical 
License Proceeding, however, did address the standard, focusing on the statu-
tory requirement that rates be “reasonable,” and suggesting that the individual 
801(b) standards could be satisfied by rates lying within a zone of reasonable-
ness.168 In its subsequent review, the D.C. Circuit agreed.169 
In 1997, a CARP took up the issue of royalties for PSS under the recently 
passed Digital Performance Right in Sounds Recordings Act.170 When the 
CARP’s decision came down heavily on the sided of the PSS, it was reviewed 
and revised by the Librarian of Congress, and rates ultimately were set at 6.5% 
of revenues.171 However, neither the Librarian’s decision nor the subsequent 
D.C. Court of Appeals decision to reject an appeal by the Recording Industry 




                                                     
 166 See 1980 Adjustment of the Royalty Rate, supra note 165, at 888–89 (reaching a 
decision in light of the 801(b) standard but observing that such criteria was not contemplat-
ed for exclusive application to the determination of the jukebox rate). 
 167 See SDARS I, supra note 15, at 4082 (noting that “[w]hile the Tribunal’s decision was 
somewhat lengthy, its consideration and application of the standard and the Section 
801(b)(1) factors was not”). 
 168 See Adjustment of Royalty Payable under Compulsory License for Making and Dis-
tributing Phonorecords, supra note 165, at 10,479; see also Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. 
v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 662 F.2d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 169 Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 662 F.2d at 11, 18; 
see SDARS I, supra note 15, at 4083 (noting that “[t]o the extent that the statutory objectives 
determine a range of reasonable royalty rates that would serve all these objectives adequate-
ly but to differing degrees, the Tribunal is free to choose among those rates, and courts are 
without authority to set aside the particular rate chosen by the Tribunal if it lies within a 
‘zone of reasonableness’”). 
 170 See SDARS I, supra note 15, at 4083 (noting that “[u]nlike prior statutory licenses 
where the Congress fixed the initial rates within the statute, the rates for the new digital 
performance right license were left to resolution by a CARP. The Librarian convened a 
CARP in 1997 for PSS and SDARS. The SDARS settled with copyright owners and with-
drew from the proceeding, and the CARP rendered a determination only with respect to the 
PSS. The Librarian reviewed the CARP’s determination and rejected it with respect to the 
rate as well as to certain terms, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit reviewed the Librarian’s decision.”). 
 171 Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Librarian of Cong., 176 F.3d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir. 
1999). 
 172 See id. at 532–33 (finding that the Librarian’s interpretation of § 802(b) was reasona-
ble and declining to impose its own interpretation). 
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2. SDARS I 
 
In January 2006, the CRB initiated a rate proceeding to establish statutory 
royalties for PSS and SDARS for 2007 and 2008 through 2012.173 The PSS 
services negotiated voluntary agreements, which were ratified by the CRB in 
late 2007,174 but the SDARS services (at that time, Sirius and XM) did not, and 
the CRB issued statutory rates for SDARS services in January 2008.175 The 
decision, known as SDARS I, left no doubt that the 801(b) standard, as inter-
preted by the CRB and reviewed by the DC Circuit, is likely to result in rates 
lower than the market-based rates set under the WBWS standard.176 
Like the Webcaster proceedings, SDARS I was a full-blown rate proceeding, 
featuring dozens of economic and industry experts, direct and rebuttal testimo-
ny and so on.177 The CRB began its analysis by seeking to establish a bench-
mark based on voluntarily negotiated rates for comparable services, and ulti-
mately chose again—as in the Webcaster II and Webcaster III proceedings—to 
rely on a model based on the market rates negotiated for interactive subscrip-
tion services.178 Based largely on an analysis by Dr. Janusz Ordover, the CRB 
determined that a royalty rate equal to 13% of subscriber revenue constituted a 
“reasonable estimate of a marketplace derived benchmark.”179 
The next step in the CRB’s analysis was to establish a “zone of reasonable-
ness” within which the final rates—based on the § 801(b) criteria—would have 
to lie.180 The Board determined that the 13% benchmark “marks the upper 
boundary of a zone of reasonableness for potential marketplace benchmarks,” 
that a lower boundary was established by the 2.35% of revenues paid by 
SDARS for musical works licenses, but that “based strictly on marketplace 
evidence, a rate close to the upper boundary is more strongly supported than 
                                                     
 173 Adjustment of Rates and Terms for Preexisting Subscription and Satellite Digital 
Audio Radio Services, 71 Fed. Reg. 1455 (Jan. 9, 2006); see also Letter from Mark L. Gold-
stein to Sen. Arlen Specter, supra note 164, at 5. 
 174 See Adjustment of Rates and Terms for Preexisting Subscription and Satellite Digital 
Audio Radio Services, 72 Fed. Reg. 71,795 (Dec. 19, 2007). 
 175 See id. 
 176 See id. 
 177 See SDARS I, supra note 15, at 4081 (stating that in addition to the written direct 
statements and written rebuttal statements, the judges heard 26 days of testimony, which 
filled over 7,700 pages of transcript, and over 230 exhibits were admitted). 
 178 See id. at 4083. 
 179 See id. at 4083, 4085–88 (explaining that the CRB continues to prefer a per-
performance metric to one based on a percentage of revenues, because several factors made 
it impractical to utilize a per-performance metric in this case). 
 180 See id. at 4083. 
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one close to the lower boundary.”181 Hence, prior to explicit consideration of 
the four 801(b) criteria, the judges had in mind a rate closer to 13% than to 
2.35%.182 
The next step in the Board’s analysis was to determine “whether these poli-
cy objectives weigh in favor of divergence from the results indicated by the 
marketplace benchmark evidence.”183 Looking at the first two criteria, which 
require, respectively, “maximizing the availability of creative works to the 
public” and providing a “fair return” to both copyright holders and users, the 
Board determined that no adjustments from market rates were necessary and, 
indeed, that the criteria do not as a general matter imply rates different from 
those set in the market.184 
The Board reached a different conclusion, however, with respect to the latter 
two criteria, § 801(b)(1)(C) (which requires an assessment of the “relative 
roles” of the copyright owner and user with respect to creative contribution, 
technological contribution, capital investment, cost, risk and contribution to the 
opening of new markets) and § 801(b)(1)(D), the non-disruption standard.185 
With respect to the “relative roles” criteria, the CRB found that the need for 
SDARS to make “new expenditures related to their satellite technology…may 
weigh in favor of a discount from the market rate.”186 However, it determined 
that this issue was “intimately intertwined” with the non-disruption standard, 
and decided to “treat the potential disruptive effect of postponing investment in 
new satellite technology” as part of its consideration of the non-disruption 
standard.187 
In applying the non-disruption standard, the Board concluded that a devia-
tion from market rates was justified on two grounds—profitability and invest-
ment.188 First, it concluded, raising rates to the market-based level would “in-
crease costs and raise the necessary critical mass of subscribers sufficient to 
generate revenues that yield EBITDA profitability.”189 Thus: 
In order not to significantly delay the attainment and amounts of EBITDA 
profitability and positive free cash flow, some rate within the zone of reasona-
                                                     
 181 Id. at 4094. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. 
 184 See id. at 4094, 4094–96. 
 185 See id. at 4096. 
 186 Id. at 4097. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. 
 189 See id. 
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bleness that is less than 13% is warranted.190 
Second, with respect to investment, it decided that royalty rates should be 
set so as not to place “any undue constraint on the SDARS’ ability to success-
fully undertake satellite investments planned for the license period.”191 Based 
on these factors, the Board found it “appropriate to adopt a rate from the zone 
of reasonableness for potential marketplace benchmarks that is lower than the 
upper boundary most strongly indicated by marketplace data.”192 Accordingly, 
it set an initial rate of 6% of revenues, rising to 8% over the six-year (2007–
2012) term of the license—roughly 50% below the 13% benchmark it had ini-
tially concluded reflected a “reasonable estimate of a marketplace derived 
benchmark.”193 
 
3. SDARS II 
 
Perhaps the best way to understand the impact of the 801(b) non-disruption 
standard is to examine how it is invoked in an actual proceeding, such as the 
one that the CRB had engaged in to determine rates for PSS and SDARS for 
the five-year term beginning in January 2013.194 In that proceeding, experts for 
copyright users repeatedly invoked the 801(b) standard as the basis for claim-
ing that rates should be set below marketplace levels in order to guarantee their 
clients a rate of return on both past and future investments, arguing that the 
standard not only permits but could require the CRB to deviate from market-
based rates in order to advance “social values”195 such as “distributive jus-
tice.”196 
For example, an expert who submitted a statement on the behalf of Sirius 
                                                     
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. SoundExchange appealed the CRB’s ruling to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
arguing that the royalty rates set by the CRB were too low, where The Court upheld the 
CRB’s ruling, stating that the CRB did not act unreasonably in setting rates. The Court did 
not, however, make a determination on whether the rates themselves were too high or too 
low. See generally SoundExchange, Inc. v. Librarian of Cong., 571 F.3d 1220 (D.C. Cir. 
2009). 
 192 SDARS I, supra note 15, at 4097. 
 193 Id. at 4093. 
 194 Determination of Rates and Terms for Preexisting Subscription Services and Satellite 
Digital Audio Radio Services, 76 Fed. Reg. 591 (Jan. 5, 2011). 
 195 Written Rebuttal Testimony of Roger G. Noll on Behalf of Sirius XM Radio Inc. at 
50, In re Determination of Rates and Terms for Preexisting Subscription Services and Satel-
lite Digital Audio Radio Services, No. 2011-1 CRB PSS/Satellite II (Copyright Royalty Bd., 
July 2, 2012), available at http://commcns.org/1hHhNEO. 
 196 Id. at 6. 
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XM asserted that the CRB is required to “ensure that all participants would still 
have voluntarily engaged in the market transactions needed to make satellite 
services available had they been aware of the rates when they made the deci-
sions to enter into those transactions,”197 which is equivalent to requiring that 
rates be set so as to guarantee investors profits on their initial investments, ap-
parently in perpetuity.198 Another expert testified that, under § 801(b), rates that 
do not permit copyright users to recover the start-up costs of entering the in-
dustry199 and ensure that they can “recover the financial cost of [future] invest-
ments” would be “disruptive,” because users must have incentives to continue 
investing in their businesses.200 To summarize, while it is theoretically possible 
for the 801(b) standard to result in the same rates as under the WBWS stand-
ard,201 there is no question that the two standards are—as one supporter of the 
IRFA recently agreed—”starkly different.”202 Nor is it surprising that, as one 
knowledgeable observer recently noted, “[T]he change from the willing buy-
er/willing seller standard to the 801(b) standard is widely anticipated to signifi-
cantly lower the royalty rates that online radio services pay.”203 As discussed 
further below, other elements of the IRFA were also designed to ensure copy-







                                                     
 197 Written Rebuttal Testimony of Dr. Michael A. Salinger on Behalf of Sirius XM Ra-
dio Inc. at 16, In re Determination of Rates and Terms for Preexisting Subscription Services 
and Satellite Digital Audio Radio Services, No. 2011-1 CRB PSS/Satellite II (Copyright 
Royalty Bd., July 2, 2012), available at http://commcns.org/1hHhNEO. 
 198 See id. 
 199 Written Direct Testimony of Roger G. Noll on behalf of Sirius XM Radio Inc. at 77, 
In re Determination of Rates and Terms for Preexisting Subscription Services and Satellite 
Digital Audio Radio Services, No. 2011-1 CRB PSS/Satellite II (Copyright Royalty Bd., 
Nov. 29, 2011), available at http://commcns.org/1eObvDj. 
 200 Id. 
 201 See Letter from Mark L. Goldstein to Sen. Arlen Specter, supra note 164, at 5. 
 202 See John Villasenor, Digital Broadcast Music Royalties: The Case for a Level Play-
ing Field, 19 ISSUES TECH. INNOVATION 1, 9 (2012) (stating that the desire to lower the 
“high royalty burdens” paid by webcasters is the primary rationale offered by IRFA’s pro-
ponents for its enactment). 
 203 See Jodie Griffin, The Internet Radio Fairness Act: Revamping the Online Radio 
Marketplace, PUB. KNOWLEDGE POL’Y BLOG (Nov. 2, 2012), http://commcns.org/1mQVeTr. 
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IV. THE NON-DISRUPTION STANDARD: THE PROPOSED 
INTERNET RADIO FAIRNESS ACT AND THE MARKET 
FOR ONLINE MUSIC 
 
The Internet Radio Fairness Act (H.R. 6480 and S. 3609)204 would have fun-
damentally altered both the standards and the process by which statutory royal-
ties were established for non-interactive webcasters like Pandora.205 As de-
scribed in the first subsection below, the clear purpose, and the virtually certain 
effect, would have been to tip the playing field against copyright owners in 
favor of the webcasters, resulting in lower royalty rates for covered webcasters 
– which of course is why the webcasters support it.206 As explained below, 
there is no evidence that high royalty rates are stifling the growth of online 
music in general or, in particular, the growth of Pandora, or that such services 
would be unable to pay market based rates in the future. 
IRFA not only sought to lower royalty rates, but also to “level the playing 
field” by subjecting Pandora and other webcasters to the same rate standard 
that now applies to PSS and SDARS services.207 The biggest problem with this 
argument is that non-interactive webcasters’ biggest competitors are not PSS 
or SDARS, but rather interactive services (like Spotify), which obtain sound 
recording performance rights without the benefit of a compulsory license of 
any sort.208 Thus, what Pandora is seeking through the IRFA is to increase the 
competitive advantage it already holds over interactive services by obtaining 
an even more attractive compulsory license.209 Meanwhile, the IRFA would 
have done nothing to address the other obvious imbalance in the sound record-
ing performance right, which is the continuing exemption enjoyed by the over-
the-air transmissions of terrestrial broadcasters.210 
The first subsection below reviews the IRFA’s main provisions and explains 
                                                     
 204 See H.R. REP. NO. 6480 (2012). 
 205 Villasenor, supra note 202, at 11. 
 206 Id. 
 207 Music Licensing Part One: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property, 
Competition, and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 165 (2012) 
(statement of Rep. Conyers, Jr., Ranking Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“The 
[IRFA] seeks to facilitate a process by which all digital music services would be judged by 
the same rate-setting standard.”). 
 208 LaPolt Law, P.C., Trends & Developments in Music Licensing, AMERICANBAR.ORG, 
http://commcns.org/1dVachQ (last visited Mar. 3, 2014); see also Eric Savitz, Pandora Asks 
Users to Lobby Congress on Royalty Rates (Updated), FORBES (Sept. 24, 2012, 5:03 PM), 
http://commcns.org/NOt1wz. 
 209 Savitz, supra note 208. 
 210 Villasenor, supra note 202, at 13. 
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the effects that they would have had on the rate-setting process and its results. 
The second subsection shows why the rates currently being paid by webcasters 
are not unreasonable, and why the IRFA is not necessary to preserve a vibrant 
and growing market for online music. The third subsection explains why the 
uneconomic rates that the IRFA would have produced, along with the perverse 
incentives inherent in the non-disruption standard, would reduce incentives for 
content creation, slow innovation, and harm consumers. 
 
A. The IRFA Would Dramatically Tilt the Rate Setting Process in Favor of 
Webcasters 
 
If one set out to write statutory language designed to favor webcasters over 
copyright owners in rate setting proceedings, the result would look a lot like 
the IRFA. While a complete exegesis is beyond the scope of this study, a par-
tial listing of its more significant provisions provides a sense of the proposal’s 
scope and ambition. Among other things, the IRFA would have: (a) imposed a 
heavily-modified version of the § 801(b) criteria for royalty rates, with the 
modifications further favoring webcasters;211 (b) intervened directly in the rate 
setting process, by extending the webcaster-friendly Webcaster Settlement Act 
rates (for small pureplay webcasters) for an extra year;212 (c) shifted the burden 
of proof to copyright holders to show that proposed rates do not exceed an 
amorphous new standard;213 (d) prohibited copyright royalty judges from con-
sidering certain types of evidence likely to favor copyright holders;214 (e) re-
versed the CRB’s (economically-grounded) decision to favor “per perfor-
mance” royalties over “percentage of revenue” royalties;215 (f) prohibited the 
                                                     
 211 See Internet Radio Fairness Act of 2012 §3(a)(1)(B) (“In establishing rates and terms 
under this paragraph, the Copyright Royalty Judges shall apply the objectives set forth in 
section 801(b)(1).”). 
 212 Id. § 3(b)(4) (“The rates and terms of any settlements made pursuant to the amend-
ments made by the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009 (Public Law 111-36; 123 Stat. 1926) 
that were to expire before December 31, 2015, shall be extended through December 31, 
2015, according to the rates and terms applicable to 2014.”). 
 213 Id. § 3(a)(2)(A)(ii) (“In any proceeding under this subsection, the burden of proof 
shall be on the copyright owners of sound recordings to establish that the fees and terms that 
they seek satisfy the requirements of this subsection, and do not exceed the fees to which 
most copyright owners and users would agree under competitive market circumstances.”). 
 214 Id. § 3(a)(2)(A)(iv) (“To the extent the Copyright Royalty Judges consider market-
place benchmarks to be relevant, the Copyright Royalty Judges shall limit those benchmarks 
to benchmarks reflecting the rates and terms that have been agreed under competitive mar-
ket circumstances by most copyright users.”). 
 215 Id. (stating that the CRJs “shall not disfavor percentage of revenue-based fees”). 
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CRB from relying on some (but not other) prior decisions as precedents;216 (g) 
reversed the Webcaster Settlement Act’s guarantee that rates negotiated under 
the Act would not have precedential value for rate setting purposes;217 (h) cre-
ated a special class of antitrust liability for joint activities by copyright owners, 
but not copyright users;218 (i) injected politics into the process by requiring 
copyright judges to be confirmed by the Senate rather than appointed by the 
Librarian of Congress;219 (j) eliminated the requirement that at least one of the 
copyright judges be an expert in copyright, and one an expert in economics;220 
and, (k) subjected CRB rate decisions to de novo review, requiring the D.C. 
Circuit essentially to re-hear every rate case.221 
Among the many changes proposed by the IRFA, the most profound include 
the provisions that alter the substantive standards for rate setting,222 specify 
what evidence the CRB can consider,223 and change the makeup of the CRB 
itself.224 
First, in addition to replacing the WBWS standard with the 801(b) standard, 
the IRFA would have added four additional criteria which must be considered 
in setting rates: (1) “the public’s interest in both the creation of new sound re-
cordings of musical works and in fostering online and other digital perfor-
mances of sound recordings”;225 (2) “the income necessary to provide a reason-
able return on all relevant investments, including investments in prior periods 
for which returns have not been earned”;226 (3) “the value of any promotional 
benefit or other non-monetary benefit conferred on the copyright owner by the 
performance”;227 and (4) “the contributions made by the digital audio transmis-
sion service to the content and value of its programming.”228 Each of these cri-
teria is favorable to webcasters, none more so than the requirement that the 
                                                     
 216 Id. (stipulating that the CRJs “shall not take into account either the rates and terms 
provided in licenses for interactive services or the determinations rendered by the Copyright 
Royalty Judges prior to the enactment of the Internet Radio Fairness Act of 2012.”). 
 217 Id. § 3(b). 
 218 Id. § 5(a)(1)(A)–(B). 
 219 Id. § 2(1)(A). 
 220 Id. § 2(2)(A). 
 221 Id. § 6(d). 
 222 Id. § 3(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). 
 223 Id. § 6(a)(1)–(2). 
 224 Id. § 2(2)(A). 
 225 Id. § 3(a)(2)(A)(iv). 
 226 Id. 
 227 Id. 
 228 Id. 
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rates be set so as to ensure copyright users earn profits on past investments.229 
Further, the IRFA would have shifted the burden of proof in rate setting pro-
ceedings to copyright owners, who would be required to establish that the fees 
in any statutory license do not exceed those to which “most copyright owners 
and users would agree to under competitive market circumstances,” defined as 
conditions in which none of the participants have market power.230 As a practi-
cal matter, it is likely that the only agreements that would meet this standard 
would be ones negotiated by the smallest independent record labels—that is, 
the ones willing to accept the lowest royalty rates. 
Second, in applying the new criteria, the IRFA would have directed the CRB 
to ignore some evidence, but demands that other evidence be considered.231 
Judges are prohibited from taking into account the rates and terms in licenses 
for interactive services (which have provided the benchmark for the market-
based rates in Webcaster II and Webcaster III) or in the CRB’s previous de-
terminations, but permitted to consider the rates set by the Copyright Royalty 
Tribunal in the early 1980s and the CARP/LOC 1998 Webcaster I decision.232 
In the meantime, rates negotiated under the Webcaster Settlement Act are, con-
trary to the Webcaster Settlement Act itself, now accorded precedential val-
ue.233 In short, evidence favorable to webcasters is required to be admitted, 
while evidence favorable to copyright owners is a priori inadmissible. 
Third, the IRFA would have changed the makeup of the CRB itself. Judges 
would have no longer been appointed by the Librarian of Congress, but instead 
by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate,234 thus ensuring that 
the filling of every vacancy would become a vehicle for a political contest be-
tween the interested parties. Of equal concern is that the qualifications of the 
judges themselves would have been changed, removing the current require-
ment that one of the three judges have a significant knowledge of economics 
and another have significant knowledge of copyright law.235 In the future, judg-
es would be required simply to have ten years of experience in arbitration or 
litigation—that is, to be process experts rather than substantive ones.236 
                                                     
 229 Id. 
 230 Id. § 3(a)(2)(A)(iv), 3(a)(3)(B) (stating the burden of proof and defining “market 
circumstances”). 
 231 Id. §§ 3(a)(3)(B), 6(a)(1)–(2). 
 232 Id. §§ 3(a)(2)(B), 6(a)(2). 
 233 Id. § 3(a)(3)(b)(3)–(4). 
 234 Id. § 2(2)(B)(i). 
 235 Id. § 2(2)(A). 
 236 Id. 
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At the end of the day, there is no question that, as Villasenor claims: the 
“obvious consequence” of imposing the 801(b) standard “would be lower rates 
for webcasters.”237 As discussed below, however, forcing copyright owners to 
effectively subsidize webcasters through artificially low royalties is neither 
necessary to promote the growth of online music nor desirable from the per-
spective of innovation or consumer welfare. 
 
B. The IRFA Is Not Necessary to Ensure a Vibrant Market for Online  
  Music 
 
The market for online music is intensely vibrant and growing rapidly.238 
Tens of thousands of new listeners are signing up to services like Pandora and 
Spotify every week, and existing listeners are using the services more and 
more intensely every year.239 Online advertising revenues are growing 30% per 
year,240 new firms are entering the market, and existing firms are garnering bil-
lion dollar market valuations.241 As Villasenor puts it, “The future of music 
distribution is clearly digital.”242 
Against this reality, the IRFA proponents argue that webcasters need the be-
low-market rates and guaranteed profits the legislation would provide in order 
to “grow and evolve.”243 Moreover, they argue, the current system is broken 
because the “onerous” WBWS standard can result in webcasters paying a 
                                                     
 237 See Villasenor, supra note 202, at 13. 
 238 Ryan Faughnder, iHeartRadio, Spotify Lead User Growth as Apple Unveils Stream-
ing, L.A. TIMES (June 11, 2013), http://commcns.org/1hDk7NJ. 
 239 Id. 
 240 See infra Figure 4. 
 241 Ingrid Lunden, Digital Ads Will Be 22% of All U.S. Ad Spend in 2013, Mobile Ads 
3.7%; Total Global Ad Spend in 2013 $503B, TECHCRUNCH.COM (Sept. 30, 2013), 
http://commcns.org/1jN9BmX (“In the U.S. . . . digital [advertising] in 2013 will account 
for 21.8% of all ad spend ($109.7 billion), up from 19% the year before.”). For example, in 
Los Angeles, California—”the vanguard of the ad evolution”—new boutique online adver-
tising firms are steadily setting up shop, with some quickly reaching hundreds of millions in 
billings. Meg James, DIGITAL DISRUPTION; Ads in a Digital Age; Westside Firms Such 
as Omelet, Ignited and Blitz are Pushing Clients Beyond TV and Print and Onto the Inter-
net, Smartphones and Tablets, L.A. TIMES, July 8, 2012, at B1. Research suggests that the 
“online advertising industry trades with an average price-earnings ratio of 28.2x compared 
to the S&P 500’s 16.2x price-earnings ratio [and its] stocks may be as much as 74% more 
expensive than the average U.S. stock.” Finding Value in the Growing Online Advertising 
Industry, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 3, 2013), http://commcns.org/MJJSzM. 
 242 See Villasenor, supra note 202, at 17. 
 243 Edward Black, Congress Should Pass the Internet Radio Fairness Act, HILL’S 
CONGRESS BLOG (Oct. 25, 2012, 11:00 AM), http://commcns.org/1hHiOg3. 
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higher percentage of their revenues in royalties than other firms, including in 
particular Sirius XM.244 Neither argument withstands even cursory scrutiny. 
First, the current copyright regime is not preventing the online music indus-
try from “growing and evolving” at a rapid pace. Online radio is a two-sided 
market, involving both listeners (who, depending on the business model, may 
also be subscribers) and advertisers.245 Both sides of the market are growing 
explosively.246 For example, Figure 2, below, shows the proportion of Ameri-
cans who have listened to online radio in the past 30 days from 2002 through 
2012. Growth throughout the period has been rapid but has accelerated in re-















                                                     
 244 See Villasenor, supra note 202, at 1–2; see Black, supra note 243. 
 245 Two-sided markets “coordinate the demands of distinct groups of customers who 
need each other in some way. . . . [F]or example . . . magazines provide a way for advertis-
ers to find an audience . . . .” David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Plat-
form Markets, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 325, 325 (2003). 
 246 “Weekly online radio reaches an estimated audience of 76 million in 2012; this 30% 
increase is the largest year over year spike in weekly usage we have seen since we began 
measuring the platform in 1998.” ARBITRON/EDISON RESEARCH, THE INFINITE DIAL 2012: 
NAVIGATING DIGITAL PLATFORMS 8 (2012) [hereinafter THE INFINITE DIAL 2012], available 
at http://commcns.org/1ksNW6C. “[T]he online advertising industry is rapidly growing . . . 
[as advertisers are] looking for a better return on investment [and] increasingly moving . . . 
to highly targeted online ads.” Finding Value in the Growing Online Advertising Industry, 
supra note 241. 
 247 The percentage of American online radio listenership grew from 27% to 39% be-
tween 2010 and 2012, an increase of slightly more than 44%. THE INFINITE DIAL 2012, su-
pra note 246, at 8. 
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FIGURE 2248 
PERCENT OF AMERICANS WHO HAVE LISTENED TO 
















As Figure 2 shows, an estimated 103 million Americans, or 39% of the en-
tire U.S. population aged 12 and older, now tune in to some form of online 
radio each month.249 Similarly, the amount of time that listeners spend engaged 
with online radio has also increased dramatically. As shown in Figure 3, in 
2012, listeners reported spending an average of 9 hours and 46 minutes per 
week listening to online radio, up from 6 hours and 13 minutes in 2008 (an 
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FIGURE 3251 
AVERAGE WEEKLY HOURS SPENT 





















Not surprisingly, the rapid growth in listenership is leading equally to rapid 
growth in advertising revenues.252 Overall, online advertising is the fastest 
growing category of advertising worldwide, growing at 7.2% over the past 
year.253 As shown in Figure 4 below, online radio advertising is growing even 
faster: According to SNL Kagan, online radio advertising revenues will ap-
proach $400 million in 2012, and are projected to grow at a compound annual 
rate between 12 and 14% over the next decade.254 
 
                                                     
 251 Figure 3 is based upon information in Edison Research/Arbitron’s report. Id. 
 252 Finding Value in the Growing Online Advertising Industry, supra note 241. 
 253 See NIELSEN, QUARTER 2 2012: GLOBAL ADVIEW PULSE LITE 8 (2012), available at 
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file with author). 
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FIGURE 4255 
PUREPLAY INTERNET MUSIC AND RADIO AD REVENUE 
PROJECTIONS, 2011–2021 ($ MIL) 
 
  
 The rapid growth of the industry has translated into financial success for 
existing firms and the entry of new ones.256 Pandora, which is by its own ac-
count the “leader in internet radio in the United States,” with a dominant mar-
ket share of 69%, has been the biggest beneficiary.257 As shown in Figure 5 
                                                     
 255 Derived from information in SNL Kagan’s report, MOBILE AD NETWORKS BY 
REVENUE. See id. Figure 4 includes online/mobile ad revenues from Internet Music and 
Radio Pureplays—for example, AccuRadio, AOL Radio, Goom Radio, Last.fm, Live 365, 
MOG, Pandora, Slacker, Stitcher, Turntable.fm, and Yahoo! Music. Id. 
 256 See Finding Value in the Growing Online Advertising Industry, supra note 241. 
 257 See Pandora Media, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 41 (Mar. 12, 2012) [herein-
after Pandora 2012 Form 10-K]. Pandora states, in its 10-K, that: 
Pandora is the leader in internet radio in the United States, offering a personalized experi-
ence for each of our listeners. We have pioneered a new form of radio – one that uses intrin-
sic qualities of music to initially create stations and then adapts playlists in real-time based 
on the individual feedback of each listener. In January 2012, we had over 125 million regis-
tered users, which we define as the total number of accounts that have been created for our 
service at period end, and we added two new registered users every second on average. For 
the fiscal year ended January 31, 2012, we streamed 8.2 billon hours of radio and as of Jan-
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below, Pandora’s annual listener hours have more than quadrupled in the last 
two years, from 1.8 billion to 8.2 billion.258 Revenues over the same period 




PANDORA ANNUAL LISTENER HOURS (BILLIONS), 2010–2012 
 
 
Much of the rapid growth that has occurred in the past few years is associat-
ed with the rapid adoption of smart phones and the accompanying increase in 
mobile consumption of digital media.261 For example, as shown in Figure 6 
                                                                                                                          
uary 31, 2012, we had 47 million active users. According to a January 2012 report by Tri-
ton, we are one of the top 20 internet radio stations and networks in the United States and 
we have more than a 69% share of internet radio. Since we launched the Pandora service in 
2005, our listeners have created over 2.4 billion stations. 
Id. 
 258 Id. at 40. 
 259 Id. at 43. 
 260 Figure 5 is based upon information in Pandora’s Form 10-K, filed in 2012. Id. at 40. 
 261 Pandora says that mobile devices are “an emerging phenomenon” and that the “num-
ber of listener hours on mobile devices has surpassed listener hours on traditional comput-
ers, and [it] expect[s] that this trend will continue.” Id. at 14. 
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below, Pandora reports that as of 2012, nearly two thirds of all listening hours 
are accounted for by mobile devices.262 Notably, SNL Kagan reports that in 
2011, Pandora was the fifth largest U.S. mobile ad network by revenue, rank-
ing behind only Google, Apple, Facebook and Twitter, and was growing at 
476% annually, far faster than any of the other top 25 firms.263 
 
FIGURE 6264 
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL PANDORA LISTENING 
HOURS ACCOUNTED FOR BY MOBILE 
 
 
As a result of its rapid growth, and of market expectations that it would con-
tinue to prosper in the future, Pandora successfully “went public” in 2011, gar-
nering large payoffs for its early investors.265 The firm now trades on the New 
                                                     
 262 Pandora reports that it’s “mobile listenership has experienced significant growth” and 
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 263 See SNL KAGAN, supra note 254, at 98. 
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Form 10-K, supra note 257, at 14. 
 265 In June 2011, Pandora’s stock “rose 8.9 percent [by virtue of] its debut on the New 
York Stock exchange,” selling “14.7 million shares . . . [and] raising $234.9 million in its 
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York Stock Exchange under the symbol “P.”266 As of March 2, 2014, Pandora 
had an Enterprise Value of $7.04 billion.267 
Pandora’s defenders argue, however, that the company has not yet achieved 
profitability, and that “extremely high royalty burdens” are to blame, with con-
tent costs accounting for 69% of revenues.268 The situation would be even 
worse, they warn, if Pandora and the other webcasters currently covered by the 
Webcaster Settlement Act agreement were forced to pay the (higher) rates de-
termined by the CRB in Webcaster III.269 There are several problems with these 
arguments. First, the fact that Pandora has not yet achieved profitability is 
hardly a surprise.270 Other successful online firms, including Facebook, Google, 
Vonage and many others, have taken years to achieve profitability;271 some 
have yet to do so.272 There is a good reason for this: Internet markets are char-
                                                                                                                          
initial public offering.” Lee Spears, Pandora Rises in Biggest Internet IPO Boom Year Since 
2000, BLOOMBERG (June 15, 2011), http://commcns.org/1cp8fPL. In the first 11 months of 
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 267 See Pandora Media, Inc. (P)—Key Statistics, YAHOO! FIN. (Feb. 28, 2014, 7:39 PM), 
http://commcns.org/1fDbhdz. 
 268 Villasenor, supra note 202, at 11. 
 269 Id. at 11–12. 
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drive advertisement opportunities (inventory), attracting advertisers depends largely on a 
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2012 Form 10-K, supra note 257, at 42. So although Pandora’s “total revenue has grown 
from $55.2 million in fiscal 2010 to $274.3 million in fiscal 2012[, a]t the same time, [its] 
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2012 Form 10-K, supra note 257, at 43. 
 271 Online firms such as Facebook, Google, and Vonage all face highly competitive mar-
kets that demand quick and constant innovation. Facebook Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-
K), at 10 (Feb. 1, 2013) [hereinafter Facebook 2013 Form 10-K]; Google Inc., Annual Re-
port (Form 10-K), at 8 (Jan. 23, 2013) [hereinafter Google 2013 Form 10-K]; Vonage Hold-
ings Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 8 (Jan. 31, 2013) [hereinafter Vonage 2013 
Form 10-K]. They must build a customer base, develop their presence, and market their 
brand, all of which take time. See Facebook 2013 Form 10-K, supra note 271, at 13, 17; 
Google 2013 Form 10-K, supra note 271, at 3, 9–10, 12; Vonage 2013 Form 10-K, supra 
note 271, at 5, 8–9. Due to the technological nature of an online market, these online firms 
generally must invest significant resources into staffing, equipment, infrastructure, research 
and development, data management, and user privacy security—all on a continuing basis. 
See Facebook 2013 Form 10-K, supra note 271, at 8–11, 15–24; Google 2013 Form 10-K, 
supra note 271, at 3, 7–12, 14, 16–19. 
 272 For example, Vonage has “incurred cumulative losses since [its] inception and may 
not achieve consistent profitability in the future. [Although it] achieved net income of [over 
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acterized by network effects, meaning that firms compete (in what is some-
times referred to as a “land grab strategy”) to achieve critical scale.273 While it 
is thus typical for firms like Pandora to invest in customer acquisition for an 
initial period before becoming profitable, there is no economic or public policy 
rationale for forcing their suppliers to subsidize such strategies.274 
Second, while Pandora’s content acquisition costs have indeed grown rapid-
ly, they have not grown as rapidly its revenues or, for that matter, as its over-
head.275 As shown in Figure 7 below, Pandora’s content acquisition costs have 
grown by 351% over the past two years. Yet, its revenues have increased even 
faster, by nearly 400%, while its administrative and overhead expenses have 












                                                                                                                          
$36 million in 2012, its] accumulated deficit is [over $726 million] from [the time of its] 
inception . . . .” Vonage 2013 Form 10-K, supra note 271, at 15. 
 273 As the D.C. Circuit noted, “In markets characterized by network effects, one product 
or standard tends towards dominance, because ‘the utility that a user derives from consump-
tion of the good increases with the number of other agents consuming the good.’” United 
States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Continuing, the court said, “For 
example, ‘[a]n individual consumer’s demand to use (and hence her benefit from) the tele-
phone network . . . increases with the number of other users on the network whom she can 
call or from whom she can receive calls.’” Id. Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit observed, 
“Once a product or standard achieves wide acceptance, it becomes more or less entrenched. 
Competition in such industries is ‘for the field’ rather than ‘within the field.’” Id. 
 274 JEFFREY H. ROHLFS, BANDWAGON EFFECTS IN HIGH-TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES 9, 14 
(2003); see also Pandora Media, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 17 (Feb. 11, 
2011) (“Since our inception in 2000, we have incurred significant net operating losses and 
as of October 31, 2010, we had an accumulated deficit of $83.9 million. A key element of 
our strategy is to aggressively increase the number of listeners and listener hours to increase 
our market penetration.”). 
 275 See Pandora 2012 Form 10-K, supra note 257, at 47. 
 276 Id. 
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FIGURE 7277 


















Third, while Pandora makes much of the fact that content acquisition ac-
counts for a large proportion of its revenues,278 in fact its content costs as a 
proportion of revenues are comparable to other, similar firms.279 For example, 
while Netflix offers video rather than audio, and its revenues come more from 
subscriptions than from advertising, its basic business model—offering on-
demand audio-video content over the Internet while minimizing its own infra-
structure costs280—is very similar to Pandora’s.281 
As shown in Figure 8 below, the proportion of revenues accounted for by 
content costs for Netflix and Pandora have been nearly identical over the last 
                                                     
 277 Figure 7 uses information in Pandora’s 2012 Form 10-K. Id. 
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 279 For example, in the years 2010 and 2011, Pandora’s content acquisition expenses 
accounted for 60% and 50% of its revenues, respectively. Id. at 47. For the same years, Net-
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2013, 1:45 PM), http://commcns.org/1fDbvBo. 
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three years (2009–2011).282 Indeed, for each of the last two years, Netflix has 




CONTENT COSTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF REVENUES 
PANDORA VS. NETFLIX, 2009–2011 
 
 
It is noteworthy that, like some of Pandora’s competitors in the audio mar-
ket, Netflix does not benefit from a compulsory license, but instead relies on 
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negotiating contracts with content owners on a voluntary basis. And while the 
firm has had some stumbles over the past year, its market capitalization in late 
2012 stood at over $4.4 billion.285 As of November 2012, the firm was fighting 
off a takeover bid by investor Carl Icahn, who believes it is undervalued, not-
withstanding the fact that it pays over 50% of its revenues for content.286 
Fourth, and finally, Pandora’s claims of impending doom with respect to 
content costs are belied by the fact that other firms are rapidly entering the 
market to compete with it. As it reports in its most recent 10-K, “the audio en-
tertainment marketplace continues to rapidly evolve, providing our listeners 
with a growing number of alternatives and new media platforms.”287 Among its 
competitors: Last.fm, iHeartRadio, and Slacker Personal Radio.288 Recent en-
trants including Rdio, “a rival streaming service created by the founders of 
Skype,”289 and Spotify, which has four million subscribers worldwide paying 
$10 per month for the right to access music online290 and was recently valued at 
$3 billion.291 As of late 2012, reports indicated that Apple was also preparing to 
enter the market for online radio.292 
The flood of new participants in the online music business is important for 
two reasons. First, these firms (and their investors) obviously do not share 
Pandora’s gloomy forecasts regarding their ability to earn a fair return on in-
vestment. Second, and at least equally important, many of these firms—
including, for example, Spotify—are not eligible for the compulsory license at 
all, and thus have no choice but to negotiate copyright agreements in the mar-
ketplace.293 According to reports, Apple may choose to enter the online radio 
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market through negotiated contracts, eschewing the compulsory license alto-
gether.294 
The fact that other firms see opportunities to profit in the online music mar-
ketplace suggests to some that Pandora needs to take a closer look at its busi-
ness model.295 As noted above, online music is a two-sided market, with some 
(and sometimes more or, even, all) of the revenues coming from advertisers. 
Yet, if a firm like Pandora is engaged in a land grab strategy designed to max-
imize its market share in the short run in order to capture economies of scale, 
too much advertising risks driving consumers to competitors.296A number of 
analysts have noted that Pandora has failed to monetize fully its large and 
growing audience.297 As one well-respected journalist put it, “Throughout the 
music industry there is a wide belief that Pandora could solve its financial 
problems—the company, which went public a year ago, has never turned an 
annual profit—by simply selling more ads.”298 
To summarize, Pandora’s argument that royalties need to be reduced in or-
der to preserve a healthy market for online music is simply not consistent with 
the facts. The market is vibrant and growing, and expected to continue to grow 
and evolve in the future. Pandora has been a major beneficiary of that growth, 
and while it would prefer to pay less for inputs into its production process, 
there is no public policy basis for forcing content creators to subsidize it or 
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C. The IRFA Would Exacerbate Market Distortions, Reduce Incentives to 
Create Content, Slow Innovation, and Harm Consumers 
 
The IRFA is advanced by its proponents on grounds that it would create a 
level playing field for users of sound recording rights, increase revenues to 
artists and record labels, and even promote innovation. 299 Each of these claims 
is incorrect. In fact, on each count, the opposite is true. 
First, while it is accurate that the sound recording performance right current-
ly does not use the same rate standard for all users and in all markets,300 it is 
inaccurate to argue that the IRFA could improve the situation. Currently, inter-
active services are subject to the sound recording performance right (but have 
no compulsory license); PSS and SDARS are subject to the 801(b) standard; 
webcasters, simulcasters and new subscription services are subject to WBWS; 
and terrestrial broadcasters are exempt altogether.301 AM/FM radio stations pay 
royalties when they “simulcast” sound recording performances over the Inter-
net, but pay nothing to “broadcast” them over the airwaves.302 The goal of cre-
ating a more level playing field is a desirable one, but the IRFA would hardly 
achieve that purpose. By lowering rates to non-market levels for non-
interactive users like Pandora, it would widen the gap between firms like Pan-
dora and interactive webcasters, like Spotify, who arguably are their closest 
competitors. At the same time, it would do nothing to rectify the imbalance 
between terrestrial broadcasters and all other users, as the former would con-
tinue to be exempt.303 From an economic perspective, the IRFA would not ame-
                                                     
 299 158 Cong. Rec. S6628, S6628–29 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 2012) (statement of Sen. Wy-
den). 
 300 Public Performance Rights for Sound Recordings Fact Sheet, FUTURE MUSIC (Jan. 
28, 2011) http://commcns.org/1gNT8MI. 
 301 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1)(A); see David Oxenford, Copyright Royalty Board Approves 
Settlement for Sound Recording Royalty Rates for “New Subscription Services” - Any Hints 
As to What A Broadcast Performance Royalty Would Be?, BROADCAST L. BLOG (Mar. 25, 
2010), http://commcns.org/1hHnEtN; see also David Oxenford, Copyright Royalty Board 
Releases New Rates for Sirius XM and Cable Radio - They are Going Up, Full Reasoning of 
the Decision to Come?, BROADCAST L. BLOG (Dec. 17, 2012), 
http://commcns.org/1g5KSWH. 
 302 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1)(A) (providing the statutory exemption); see Bonneville Int’l 
Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 490 (3d Cir. 2003) (affirming the Copyright Office’s rule, 
which provided that “AM/FM webcasting is not an exempt transmission under § 
114(d)(1)(A)”); see also Public Performance of Sound Recordings: Definition of a Service, 
65 Fed. Reg. 77,292 (Dec. 11, 2000) (promulgating the rule at issue in Bonneville). 
 303 158 Cong. Rec. at S6628 (statement of Sen. Wyden) (“[The IRFA] would . . . treat 
Internet Radio, for purposes of establishing royalty rates, in the same way that satellite and 
cable radio are treated.”). 
54 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS [Vol. 22 
liorate, and might have exacerbated, the economic distortions associated with 
the current system. 
It is informative, in this regard, that the IRFA’s proponents are unable to 
proffer a policy-based rationale, let alone an economically plausible one, for 
leaving the terrestrial exemption in place. For example, the only rationale Vil-
lasenor offers for not extending the sound recording performance right to over-
the-air terrestrial broadcasters is a political one: “legislation including a provi-
sion ending the terrestrial broadcasters exemption would be likely to fail.”304 
Second, the argument that artists and record labels would be better off under 
artificially low rates fundamentally ignores the economics of two-sided mar-
kets, in which firms like Pandora act as intermediaries between consumers, 
advertisers and content providers. In such markets, market rates strike the cor-
rect balance between the quantities provided on each side of the market. The 
efficient outcome, in other words, is the one that occurs when all market partic-
ipants face market prices. As the CRB has said, “We agree with Dr. Ordover 
that ‘voluntary transactions between buyers and sellers as mediated by the 
market are the most effective way to implement efficient allocations of societal 
resources.’”305 Indeed, even some of the IRFA’s proponents appear to recog-
nize the flaw in this argument, acknowledging that “while rates that are too 
high can be punitive, so can rates that are too low, as they shortchange the con-
tent creators on which the entire music broadcasting industry depends.”306 It is 
crucial to remember, in this regard, that a significant proportion of perfor-
mance rights royalties flow through to the performers.307 Thus, the cross-
subsidies granted to webcasters under the IRFA would come not just from the 
record labels, but from the artists themselves. 
Finally, the argument that the IRFA, by imposing a non-disruption criterion 
on the rate setting process for a vibrant, rapidly changing digital music distri-
bution industry, would enhance innovation,308 is as misguided upon close ex-
amination as it seems upon first blush. While it is true that “[o]ne obvious con-
sequence of broadly applying § 801(b) would be lower royalty rates for 
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webcasters,”309 it does not follow that lower rates would cause webcasters to be 
more innovative. To the contrary, imposing a non-disruption standard would 
protect incumbent webcasters from competition and innovation by demanding 
that rates be set so as to provide a guaranteed profit on both previous and new 
investments.310 This is the stuff of public utility regulation, not the dynamic 
Internet, and it would retard innovation, not advance it. As Dr. Janusz Ordover 
put it in his expert testimony in the ongoing SDARS II proceeding: “[T]he 
fourth policy factor . . . should never be used to shield the service at issue from 
the full rigors of vigorous marketplace competition. Doing so is likely to harm 
consumers and also impede (or deter) entry and expansion of rival services.”311 
To summarize, the primary purpose of the IRFA, and one of its certain ef-
fects, was to produce below-market royalty rates for one class of online music 
distributors, providing its beneficiaries with a de facto cross subsidy. Further, 
the IRFA would have locked in the resulting profits by guaranteeing 
webcasters a return on both existing and future investments. The asserted pub-
lic policy justifications for these proposed market interventions are without 
merit; indeed, the IRFA would have distorted markets, retarded innovation, 
and, ultimately, deprived consumers of the benefits associated with competi-
tion and free markets. 
 
V. SUMMARY AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The current sound recording performance right is imperfect, most notably 
because of the distortions associated with the fact that it does not apply to ter-
restrial broadcasters.312 Over the course of nearly 20 years, however, Congress 
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has moved gradually in the direction of expanding the sound recording right 
and, in so doing, increasing the role of market forces in allocating the econom-
ic resources used to produce, distribute and consume musical entertainment. 
As long as government remains enmeshed in the process of setting rates, there 
will be calls from interested parties for Congress to intervene on their behalf. 
Such calls should be seen, however, for what they are, and resisted. There is no 
public policy case in favor of the IRFA, only a political one. 
